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ACIMG SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREFAThis repDrt was prepared by a group of experts appointad by
the late Seuetary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, under General
Assembly resolution 1516 (XV) to assist him in conducting a study
of the economic and social consquences of d i m e n t in countrip
with different economic systems and at different stages of econormc
development.
The members of the group acted in their p m m l capacities and
their observations and recommendations were put forward to me on
thur own responsibility. I am convinced that their report rep-ts
a major step forward in the consideration of the economic and d
consequences of disarmament and 1 am plased to endorse their
general findings. It is now my privilege to submit the report to the
Economic and Social Council for its consideration and transmittal,
along with its comments, to the General Assembly.
The members of the group were: V. Y. Aboltin, Deputy Director,
Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy
of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Marnoun
Beheiry, Governor, Bank of S u b ; Arthur J. Brown, Head, Department of Economics, University of Leeds, England ; B. N.
Head,The Delhi School of Economics, India; Aftab Ahmad
Chid Economist, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistani
Oskar Lange, Chairman, Economic Council, Council of Ministers of
the Government of the Pe le's Republic of Poland ; W.W. Leontief,
Professor of Economics,%award University, United States; Jd
Antonio Mayobre, Ambassador of Venezuela to the United States;
Alfred Sauvy, Director, National Institute of Demographic Studies,
Government of France ;and Ludek Urhan, Economic Institute, Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences. Mr. Sauvy was represented at the
meetings of the second session of the group by Paul Paillat, also
of the National Institute of Demographic Studies. Mr.Jacob L. Mosak,
Director of the Division of General Economic Research and Policies
of the United Nations Secretariat, served as Chairman.
In preparing the report the ex rts had available replies of Governments to a note wrbale of the &re(nry-&neral on the economic
and social consequences of disarmament, which was sent in accordane
with the unanimous recommendation of the group. Communimtions
on the subject were also received from a number of the specialized
a p c i e s of the United Nations. The replies of Governments, together
wlth the relevant information from the specialized agencies, are re
produced in part I1 of the report.
The group was assisted in its work by members of the Secretariat
from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at United

Nations Headquarters and from the Em&c Cornmiasion for Europe,
colkborating in accordance with that Commission's resolution 1 (XVI)
It is everywhere recagnized that the probhms of dkamment
considered in the present report are among the most vital before the
United Nations today. In d e d i with its economic and sochi conrmmmt,
h e r d and
cmqlete. They have reviewed the resources devoted to military pwtohi& ' t b remurce~r
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LETTER OF TRANSkllTTAL
to the Acting S m - G e n e r a l

We have the honour to submit herewith the study, Report on the
Economic and S o c a Conseqesences of Disamuwlsent, which we were
invited to prepare in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1516
IXV).
An outline of the report was prepared during meetings held in
Geneva between 7 and 18 August 1961, and the report was drafted
during meetings held at the Headquarters of the United Nations between
23 January and 16 February 1962. Mr,Jacob L. Mosak, Director of the
Division of General Economic Research and Policies of the United
Nations Secretariat, served as Chairman at both sessions.
We are happy to be able to present, for your consideration, a
unanimous report surveying the nature and magnitude of the economc
and social benefits and he problems of conversion arising from disarmament, together with the general lines on which the main problems
can be solved.
In preparing this report we have drawn, among other sources,
upon the replies provided by Governments to a note verbale which was
sent by the Secretary-Ckneral in accordance with a recommendation
of the group. We should like to express our appreciation for these
replies : in view of their authoritative nature, they are a valuable source
of information and we have included them in part II of our report.
The members of the Consultative Group wish to express their very
profound gratitude for the valuable assistance which they received from
the mernkrs of the Secretariat, without which their task could not
have been completed.
Respectfully yours,

United Nations, New York
16 February 1962

Editorial note
Volume I1 of this report, containing the replies of Governments
and communications from specialized agencies on the economic and
&a1 consequences of disarmament, is h
i issued separately as an
addendum to the present document, ~/3593&.1.

INTRODUCTION

I. Realization that the disarmament issue is im ortant-as irnportant as the survival of humanity itself-is worl -wide. This is
exemplified by a ~esolutionadopted m 1959 by the General Assmbfy
in which the question is called "the most important one facing the world
today", and in which Rope is expressed that "measures leading towards
the goal of general and complete disarmament under dective international control will be worked out in detail and a p e d upon in the
shortest possible tirne".l This sense of urgency springs mainly from the
existence of a threat to mankind that has grown into one of mass
destruction. But in part, also, it comes from the consciausness that the
resources that make this threat possible, and many more resources
devoted to Iess spectacularly destructive military uses, are being diverted
from the tasks of lightwing the burdens and enriching the lives of
individuals and of society.
2. At the same time, it is seen that disarmament would a%ect
individuals, countries and the entire world economy in many different
ways. A substantial part of the world's labour force now earns its
living, directly or ind~rectly,in meeting military demands. To redeploy
this force for non-military purposes is an operation large enough to give
rise to important problems of economic and social adjustment. Careful
advance study is required for fufl advantage to be taken of the
potential benefits disarmament could make possible. The fallowing
chapters attempt a survey of the magnitude of both the benefits it would
bring and the difficultiesthat would have to be overcome in the econwzic

d

and social fields.

3. In many respects the available data fall short of what is needed
for a corn rehensive and uantitative analysis. Nevertheless, the broad
nature an magnitude of 9,e economic and' social benefits and the problems of conversion arising from disarmament, and the general lines on
which the main problems can be solved, emerge sufficiently clearly from
what is already h w n .
4. This Consultative Grou on the economic and social consequences of disarmament has dea t with the subject on the assumption
that disarmament, once agreed upon, would be general and cornpIete
and also rapid. It has done so in the belief that this was the intention
of the General Assembly resolution under which it was appointed:
and also because this interpretation gives the clearest form to both the
b-efits and the difficulties, thereby minimizing the risk that the latter
will be under-estimated.

f

P

--

'See O f i a l Records of the Gunsrd Asamnbly, Fourteenth SesGon, S*
plrrrrrrr# No. 16, resolution 1378 (XIV).
a The text of General Assembly rtsolution 1516 (XV),
. . under which the moup
- appointed, is given in annex 1;
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5. The report represents the unanimous findings of the Consultative Group. It deals with the volume of resources devoted to
military purposes and the peaceful uses t o which these resources might
be put when released, and with the transitional or conversion problems
that would arise, both at the aggregate level of national production and
employment and in particular sectors of the economy. The impact of
disarmament o n international economic relations is studied as well as
the effects of d~sarmamenton the volume and framework of ad for
economic development. Finally, some social consequences of disarmament are considered.

CHAPTER 1

RESOURCES DEVOTED TO MILITARY PURPOSES
. 6. The most fundamental way in which disarmament affects
q o n o ~ cIiEe is through the liberation of the resources devoted to
rnifitaiy use and their re-employment for peaceful purposes. This shift
the composition of the aggregate demand for goods and services is
~ i y p l ya hrge-sale manifestation of a henomenon that is constantly
#kmg place in all economies as the emand for certain goods and
services shrinks while the demand for other goods and services expands ;
thus disarmament in its economic aspects should not be considered as a
unique' phenomenon. Short-term shifts in demand on an even larger
scale than that whicli would accompany any agreed disarmament programme have' qccurred when economies have been converted to war
production, or -when they have undergone conversion to peacetime
patterns of production at the end of the war.
7. It is important, however, that countries, in preparing to disarm, should take stock of the various resources that disarmament would
release for eaceful uses. Such a survey would facilitate economic
planning an adjustment at a11 Ievels, public and private, national and
international.
8. To assess the transitional problems that may arise and to
determine the peacelut uses to which the resources released may be put,
it is necessary to ascertain in some detail the volume and composition
of resourcs so released. An approximation to the volume of resources
that would be liberated by disarmament is provided by the published
~fficialestii~latesof military expenditure.' On the basis of available
data there a pears to be general agreement that the worId is spending
roughly $12 billion annually on military account at the present time.
This figure is equivalent to about 8-9 per cent of the world's annual
output of dl goods and services; it is at least two-thirds of-and according to some estimates may be of the same order of magnitude a-the
entire national income of all the under-developed countries. It is close
to the value of the world's annual exports of all commodities and it
,Imrrespondsto about one-half of the total resources set aside each year
.for gross capital formation throughout the world.
9. The world's armed forces now number about 20 million per!sons. This figure does not include all those currently employed in
,$upplyingmilitary goods or services directIy to the armed forces or in
~roducingthe raw materials, equipment and other goods that are needed
mdirectly in the production ,ofmilitary supplies and services. The t o b l

B
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'Available data on military expenditures in the national budgets of countries
are given in annex 2, tables 2-1, 2-2 and 23.
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ofall persons in the armed forces and in all produdive activities resuIting
from military expenditure may amount to well over 50 million.
10. These figures demonstrate that the total volume of manpower and of other productive resour= devoted to military us? at the
present time is very large indeed. The available data do not, however,
make it possible to assess with the desired d ee of accuracy the volume
of resources that disarmament would actua ly release. For one thbg,
the existing estimates may not be comprehensive: some ategoria of
military expenditure may be excluded. Further, there may be considerable inconsistency in the pricing of military output compared with the
pricing of other production, as also in the relationship between the pay
of the armed forces and civilian wages and salaries. For these and
other reasons it would be wrong to interpret the share of d t a r p
expenditure in total output as a precise measure of the real share d
national resources aIIocated to military pur~oses,unless appropriate
adjustments could be made for coverage, pnce differentials and other
elements of incomparability.
11. Although the data provide an inadequate basis for predse
comparisons of the milhry burdens among countries, it a n be safely
asserted that within most countries military expenditure accounts for a
very signscant proportion of total, ou ut. In many camtries the
est~rnatesof military expenditure range tween 1 and 5 per cent of
oss domestic product, while in others, pa+icularty in some of the
&r
countries, the corresponding ratio ranges between 5 and 10
per cent.

"ff

%

12. While the burden of armaments is wide-spread, the great
bulk of the wortd's military expenditure is highly concentrated in a

handful of countries. Available indications are that about 85 per cent
of the world's military outlays is accounted for by seven countries-Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States
of America. Total military expenditure in all the under-developed
countries amounts to about one-tenth of that of the industrid private
enterprise economies. This means that although many under-developed
countries devote significant proportions of their resources to military
purposes, the great bulk of the resources released by dkrmmtnt
would be concentrated in a very few countries.'

13. It should be noted that an agreed disarmament programme
would invoIve alternate security arrangements. Thus, the recent joint
statement of the United States and the Soviet Union on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations provided that "During and after
the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of
the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place
at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for
'This is less true of manpower than of other resources, since the underdeveloped countries rely much more on numbers of men than on advataeed aad
expensive armaments and equipment.

ce force to be equipped with agreed types of
an intemationaI
rrrmament~".~
Whi c these arrangements would necessitate the continued
a h t i o n of funds and resources to m i l i t q purposes, it m y be assumed
that these wwld be small in relation to current expenditure.
14. In order to formuIate economic and social plicits so as to
take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by disarmament, it is
necessary for the countries concerned to know in detail the possible
alternative uses for the resources released. In general it can be said
that the ease and effectiveness with which the various resources liberated
by disarmament night be employed for peaceful purposes would depend
on the extent to which the composition of the demand for additional
cirilian uses approximated that of the resources now devoted to armaments. Because of the relative immobility of some resources in the
short run, systematic advance study is needed so as to minimize
wastage in the transitional stage, though in the long run any country's
Industrial capacity can be adapted to meet the changing pattern of
demand.
15. To prepare a list of the resources absorbed by armaments,
it is desirable that each country should, at the appropriate time, determine the composition of military expenditure and estimate the
productive resources that it absorbs. The latter calctdation is straightforward with respect to certain components of militay expenditure.
The members of the armed form, for example, constitute a Iabour
supply that would otherwise be available for peaceful purposes.
Similarly, those research facilities empIoyed for military purposes
which are adaptable to civilian research are rcadilv identified. Other
productive resources, however, are devoted to military use only in
an indirect manner which may not be apparent at first glance. While
it is clear, for example, that the labour and capacity in ordnance production are employed solely for military purposes, it is impossible to
state, without careful analysis, what proportion of the manpower and
other resources devoted to, say, coal mining are so employed. If
ordnance factories use any coal, some portion of the productive resources of the coal mining industry are engaged, indrrectly, in the
production of armaments. But to take into account all the inter-industry
relationships in a national economy in order to provide a complete
picture of the resources absorbed far military purposes requirfs considerable statistical information and a thorough economic analysrs of an
economy's productive structure. The degree of elaboration with which
statistics should be compiled and economic analysis performed for this
purpose varies from country to cotlntry according to the complexity
and size of the national economy. Analogous considerattons apply to
the determination of the amount of resources required directly and

f=

I
I

indirectly to satisfy alternative peacetime needs.
16. Data made available by a number of countries show that
military production is highly concentrated in a few industry groups,
notably munitions, electrical machinery, instruments and related products, and transportation equipment, including airplanes and missiles.
'See General Assembly document A/4879, Ioinf S t u t ~ m on
l A$rasrt Pritl&It# for Disammumt NegofiaEions, submitted by the Swict Uaion and &
United States.
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There is a similar concentration in the same industries ' of the employment resulting from military expenditure.* In most other industries
military outlays account for a relatively small propoddn of tool
demand. Industries dependent on military expenditure aIso have a high
degree of concentration in certain regions and cities. While this pattern
of concentration of output and employment is not necessarily characteristic of all countries, it appears to apply generally to the major
military powers,
17. The situation is rather di£ferent in those couhtries that rely
upon imports for their supplies of military goods or in which -the
majw p r t of military expenditure is for the pay and gubsistence of.
the armed forces, rather than for their equipment. In such cases, tb
mourms devoted to miIitary purposes' consist essentially of manpower:
and foreign exchange. This is especially true ,ofthe under:ded@.
countries. While disarmament would require all countries- to make
Liigfiifimnt adjustments, the reaIization of the great - potendal gains:
from disarmament in underdeveloped countries would depend on a.
major htensifiation of efforts to promote economic development, Such
efforts would be facilitated in so far as niilitary spending were channelled ta development expenditure and as scarce foreign .excbng!
resources hitherto directly or indirectly utilized for military objectives'
were freed far development purposes ; and stiIl more t o tht 'extent that'
aid were forthcoming from the industrially advanced countries
.
in ,.the:
form of both capital equipment and technical aisigtance.
.
,

'St=, for ex-ample, the reply of the ~ ~ v e ~ m of
, mthe'United
t
Amenm.

.

of
.

CHAPTER
!

2

THE PEACEFUL USE OF RELEASED RESOURCES

18. There are so many competing clai~nsfor usefully employing
h e resources released by disarmament that the real problem is to
establish a scale of priorities. The most urgent of these claims would
undoubtedly already have been largely satisfied were it not far the
armaments race.
19. The resources liberated by disarmament within any country
could be employed in part to promote economic and social progress at
home in part to expand foreign aid, The question of aid to underdeveloped countries is sufficiently important to warrant treatment in a
separate chapter (chapter 6 ) . The main civilian purposes for which the
freed resources, whether domestic or foreign in origin, could be
applied, may be classified as follows:
Raising standards of personal consumption of goods and services;
- Expanding or modernizing productive mpacity through investment
. in new plant and equipment ;
Promoting housing construction, urban renewal, including slum
clearance, and rural development ;
Improving and expanding facilities for education, health, welfare,
social security, cultural development, scientific research, etc.
P-& of the gain from disarmament could also take the form of an
increase in Ieisure as, for example, through a reduction in average
working hours without a corresponding reduction in real income, or
through an increase in paid vacations.
20. The various claims u p n resources Iisted above are, of course,
closely interlinked. A rise in personal consumption may necessitate
new investment in industry or agricuIture or both. Enlarged aid from
the industrial to the under-developed countries may involve expanding
capacity for the production of the goods that the latter countries need,
notably capital equipment. As regards the under-developed countries
fhemselves, if additional aid is to bring the greatest benefits, a larger
vdurne of investment out of domestic resources is likely to be required ;
this would be facilitated by the release of internal resources through
disarmament.
21. Since it can be assumed that the economy as a whole is
high1 flexible in the long run, the resources freed by disarmament
coulJultimately be used for any m e or more of the purposes listed
above, and in any combination. Labour can be retrained and, where
necessary, can move to other areas. As old equipment becomes obsolete
it can be repIaced by new equipment oriented to new patterns of
'

demand. In the long run, there should be little diiculty in adapting
resources to needs.
22. ln the very short run, by contrast, the range of choice may
be somewhat more limited. It takes time to turn swords into ploughshares or to make an office clerk or factory worker out of a soldser.
Studies in some industrial countries have shown that the prductive
capacities released from military use would k much more immediately
adaptable to the increased output of consumer durables and industrial
equ~prnentthan to the production of houses, food, clothing or educational facilities. Thus, in the transition period, countries may wish to
take into account not merely the unsatisfied needs for higher cansumption, investment and foreign aid, but also the extent to which
alternative patterns of new expenditure would take fuU advantage of
rticular resources that disarmament would make available. It
~
U however,
Y
sho= d,
be borne in mind that some of the major m i l i w
powers now have fairly comfortable margins of productive capacity
available to them. In these eases it is unlikely that disarmament would
generate many new demands that could not fairly readily bc s a w
from available resources.l
23. In the centrally planned economies, even though they have
pnerally been operating approximately at capacity, the transfer of
industrial capacity and labour force to the production of gwds for
peaceful uses cottld be achieved in a relatively short time. Ths tmsfer
could be readily achieved by measures formulated within the framework
of the general economic plans which can ensure a desirable balance
between demand and resources.
24. In the under-developed countries the principal resource
released, apart from the purely financial, would be manpower, both
skilled and unskiIIed. In some cases a significant pro rtim of industrial and transport crapacity would also become ami able for otfitr
uses. In many there would also be considerable savings in f d g n
exchange. The effective utilization of r e l e a d resources would depend
upon the soundness and vipur of development programmes and the
volume and character of aid received.

P"

25. Among the alternative uses of resources released by disarma-

ment, increased personal consumption might well absorb a large share.
It is fair to suppose that even in the developed countries there would
be strong pressure on G o v e m e n t s to raise the level, of living. Disarmament would, in particular, offer an impartant opportunity b

raise incomes of low incorne sections of the population and to facilitak
equdizing the rates of pay for men and women.
26. In most countries, however, not all the resources freed by
dismmment would be allocated directly to consumption, no nmtter
what the level of income might be. In the first pIae, a substantial
portion of the released resources would be used for expansion of
productive capacities because only such expansion can provide a firm
basis for further increases in consumption. Ministers representing
the countries of western Europe and North Acmeri~~.
recwtl set as a
collective target the attainment during the decade from 1
to 1970
of a growth in real gross national product of 50 per cent for all the
countries taken together? In the Soviet Union, according to existing
plans for economic development, industrial production should reach,
in the course of the present decade, a level two and one half times the
present volunle. A more rapid rate of growth would also enable mtries with a higher degree of industrialization to contribute more effectively-through greater financial and technical assistance and through
the widening of markets for exporttito the development of countrie~
that are less advanced industrially.
27. Recent experience in both private enterprjse and socialist
economies provides a rough guide in judging how much additional
investment a seecific growth target requires. Among the industrialied
private enterprise economies, it appears that during the nineteen a e s
a country experiencing a 4 per cent annual rate of growth needed, om
the average, to devote about 2 per cent more of gross national product
to investment than did a country having a 3 per cent rate of growth.8
In most of these countries, 2 per cent would constitute a very significant
proportion of the resources disarmament would release. In the less
developed countries which have low levels of income and saving, the
utilization of rel-d
resources for capital formation must be considered vitally important.

d

28. S e a l investment is an important alternative both to private
consumption and to industrial and agricultural investment. Its A i m s
rest partly upon the clear urgency of the direct need for improved
s o d amenities, and partly upon the fact that growth of industnal and
agricultural roductivity is dependent upon developments in education,
homing,
and ofher fields. Since social invwtwnt has had to
compete with military claims for state funds, it (like aid to underdeveloped countries) has probably been particularly affected by the
armaments race. Recognition of the necessity to remedy the resulting
ddciencies in the stock of social capital is wide-spread among cowtries at different stages of economic development and with different
economic systems. There is no common measure of need according to
which it is possible to add up, or to compare, the deficiencies in diffemnt
fields of social investment or different countries. Nevertheless, the

beak
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*For further details see mted Na~ons, Wwld Economic S ~ m p ,1959
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importact of the subject warrants an attempt to set out the main
relevant pieces of evidence.
29. - In the United States the Mationd Planning Association estiinated at the end of 1959 the cumulative expenditure requirements
for selected government programmes over the next five years.' These
estimates were not intended to be precise but simply represented a
summary of the existing programmes of develo ment and improvement
in mious fields over the next five years. T sigdcance of them
estimates, which imply annual average expenditures of $66 billion, may
be judged from the fact that the present spendmg of the Federal, State
and lo& governments on all these programmes amounts to about $30
bilIion per year. It is therefore apparent that these programmes could
absorb much or most of any resources released by disarmament.
30. In the Soviet Union the task has been set of achieving a sharp
improvement in living standards within the next twenty years by raising
the income of the population and also by expanding s o d bend&
(education, health protection, social insurance, housing constnrction,
etc.). As stated in an official document, "general and complete disarmament on t h e basis of an appropriate agreement between States
would make- it considerably easier to overfulfd the planned improveplent
in the living standards of the working people"?
31. It will be noted that the hrghest single figure among the
programmes for the United States mentioned above is that for urban
mwl avd d e v e l o p m t , including slum clearance, low-cost housing
and community redevelopment. The problem of u r h n renewal is worldwide. In 1950 about 80 per cent of the world's population was still
living in rural areas. Between 50 and 60 million people are being added
to the world's total population every year, mainly to its urban areas.
In Asia as many as 500 million persons may be added h e e n 19%
and 1975 to the population of cities with over 20,000 inhabitants. In
Latin America, sixty-two cities with over 108,000
ple accounted
in 1960 for son~e40 per cent of the region's total. In frica a considerably higher rate of growth is taking place in urban areas than in rural
areas;. Rapid urbanization is characteristic of Europe and North
America.
32. The rural and urban environments in many cwntrics are both
deteriorating, mainly under the irnpaet of this rapid growth. The social
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and physicsl symptoms of this deterioration are bad h o u s i n g r COI?munity services and delinquency, the paralysis of city tra c, and m
many of the less developed countries an absence of sanitation acompanied by a high incidence of mmmunic;able disease. In many
metr olitan cities of such less developed countries
settleT already contain a considerable part of the p o p uatters'
ments
tion.
33. The magnitude of the resources required for dealing with the
problem of urbanization is very la e. In India alone, for exampIe,
?ppr+ately
$1 billion a year w% be r uired t o h o w the new
lnhabltants of cities with over 100,000 A e . The provision of d
wide services, utilities and t-porkation
would at least double
needed investment. In Latin America it was estimated by the Organization of American States in 1954 that an annual investment of $1.4
billion was required over a period of thirty yaxs to wipe out the
housing backlog, to replace obsolescent dwellings and to rovide homes
for new households. According to rough estimates by the nited Nations
Bureau of Social Affairs, as many as 150 million families in the less
developed countries are in need of adequate homes. These immense
requirements are contributing in many under-developed countries to
the maintenance of a level of spendin on housing and urban development such that the pressing claims o directly productive seetors have
to be curtaiIed.
34. In the Soviet Union a housing shortage. still exists despite
the building of dwellings for nearly 50 million pecpIe in the East five
years. "The housing problem remains acute. The growth of the urban
population in the Sov~etUnion during the p s t few years is consideribly
in excess of the estirnate~."~
In order to overcome the shortage and
house every family in "a separate, comfortable aparkment", an increase
in twtinty years of about 200 per cent would be required in the existin
housing facilities. To r a c h this goal it is required that average ann
housing construction be raised from the target of 135 million square
metres in 1%165 to 400 mjllion square metres in 1976-80.P
35. Another field in wbich the supply of social capital is deficient
in many countries is road and air tratlspo~tatwn.~
The rapid increase
in the stock of automobiles and the lag in road facilities in these cowtries during the post-war years have been accompanied by extraordinary
congestion and numbers of accidents. Airports and other air facilities
are also deficient in many under-developed areas as well as in some more
advanced economies, aad investment in civil aviation will claim a share
of the resources freed by disarmament.
36. The dm~opnmfavd E O ~ D S - ~ ~ O X of tt~tpwdresour~e~
imvides another important field for increased outlays in the event of disarmament. In the United States it has been estimated that Federal
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expenditure requirements up to 1980 in the field of water resource
development alone total almost $55 billion, while $173 billion will be
needed for non-Federa1 propammes.@The Soviet Union cottld advance
the preparation and in~pIementationof a number of important naturetransforming projects in various parts of the country in order to
improve living and workitig conditions for the people. There is, for
example, a pIan to divcrt part of the waters of the Pechora, Vychegda
and Ob Rivers illto the basins of the Volga and the Caspian and Aral
Seas. This would bring ahout a considerable change in the cIi~nateand
in living conditions in Ccntral Asia and in the southern European part
of the Soviet Union. In under-deveIoped countries there are also many
important mnltipurpose schemes for the conservation and the utilization
of water resources.

37. The world's demand for water is growing much more rapidly
than the s~tpply,and a continuation of present trends implies a growing
deterioration in the balance of demand and supply. Increasing supplies of
water are needed not merely in order to keep pace with the rapid rise in
population, but also in order to meet the still faster growing needs for
irrigation and industry. In many countries most of the cheapest soitrce
of supply for water have already been tapped, so that fttrther expansion
of supplies necessitates increasingly heavy investment in obtaining
access to other sources, including the purification of sea water.
38. Other urgent requirements for natural resource development
and conservation exist in the fields of forestry, soil and watershed
conservation, rangeland conservation, park and recreational development
and fish and wildlife conservation. In the United States the total Federal
cost of proposed programmes in these areas over a period of ten years
implies an annual rate of almost $4. billion, or almost twice the current
rate of expenditure. In addition, scientific research and investigation
in the heId of natural resources will have to be expanded at considerable
cost. In western Pakistan a master plan has been prepared for soiI
reclamation and conservation in order to combat the twin menaces
of water-logging and salinity. The cost during the next ten years is
estimated at $1.2 billion.
INVESTMENT
IN HEALTH,

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES

39. Ariother major itse of the resources released from disarmament is investment to raise standards of health, education and social
services. There is an urgent need for improvement in health services
throughout the world. In many countries the ratio of doctors, dentists
and other medical personnel to the population is inadequate and even
falling, and there are also great deficiencies in the supply of hospitals
and hospital beds as wet1 as of other basic health facilities. The backlog
that many countries have to make up in order to attain the hest current
levels of hospital facilities is very large. In some of the poorer countries
of Europe, for example, the medicaI facilities availaMe to each doctor
have been estimated to be as little as one-fiftieth of those prevailing in
the better e uipped countries. Yet even in the richest countries there
is great nec to improve standards of medical services. In Canada and
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the United States, for instance, the deficit in hospital beds has bem
estimated at from a quarter to a half of the existing nurnber.1° In under-

developed countries the need for improved medical care is obviously
greater. This is indicated, for example, by infant mortality rates in
excess of 100 per 1,000 in many of these countries as opposed to rates
of 20 to 30 per 1,000 in economically advanced countries.
40. An indication of the magnitude of investment requirements
for m e d i d care may be gained from projections for the United S ~ t e s .
The present rate of construction, plus a limited r o v e of renovation, modernization and increase in rehabilitation h t i e s , would require
at least $15 billion over the next decade instead of the $9 billion that
would be needed if such changes were not carried out.11 In the Soviet
Union it has been officially suggested that hospital accommdatiw might
be increased by 40 per cent (that is, by several hundred thousand I d s )
at low cost b converting into hospitals part of the buildings now in

military use.d
41. In most developed countries cducationaJ needs are rising and
are bound to expand even more rapidly; with the ever wider spread
of technical progress there will be a rising premium on a higher
edumtional background, on htter scientific and technological &ills and
on a broader range of knowledge. At the same time greater efforts will
be directed towards reducing the drop-out rate of the less talented and
towards ensuring that an increasing roportion of the highly taIented
reach upper levels. The realization o JI these purposes would imply
the devising of new kinds of education and provision of adequate means
so that people keep abreast of the latest developments in howledge.
42. In the United States, existing standards currently require an
expenditure level of $20 billion for school enrolments in kinde
through twelfth grade, and of $6.7 billion for institutions of rgher
education. Projections on this basis alone indicate for 1970 a rise of SO
p r cent in the first ase and of more than 250 per cent in the second
case. In a disarmed economy it would also be easier to meet the demands
for better standards of education.
43. According to recent estimates, western Europe's expenditure
on education may rise from $9 bilIion in 1958 (including both current
and capital outlays) to over $18 billion, on a high estimate, in 1 9 7 G
an increase of over 100 per cent.18 As a result, outlays for education
may rise from 3.2 per cent of gross national product to 4,O per cent.
Western Europe would also face important problems at the university
level if a target were set for raising the European enrolment in the 20-24
y a r age roup from 5 per cent as at present to the United States ratio
of over per cent."
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"Royal Commission on Canada's Eonomic Prospects, Housing and S o d
Capital (Ottawa, 19571, and mnud reports of thc United States Department of
Health Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C.).
See the reply of the Government of the United States of America.
"Embassy of the Union of Soviet SoeiaIist Republics, Washington, D.C.,
Pmss Dqmrt"pt M e a x Na 65, 2 February 196d
Orgamzatton for European Economic Co-operation, T w g s l for Bdw&n
t Earope, by Svennilson, Edding and Elvin, p. 105.
YDewhurst, Cop-,
Yates and Associates, E~wropc'sN e d s and Rc~owrccr,
(New Yoyk, 1961) p. 343.
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44, In the Soviet Union general and plytechnical m n d a r y
(eleven-year course) education for all children of school-going age is
to be introduced in the next ten years. It is planned that the number of
students resident in boarding schmls and extended day-are -1s
should increase from 1.5 million at present to 2.5 million in 1965. The
shortage of space in schools has led to using the building facilities in
shifts; but teactdng on a shift basis is expected to stop completely in
the near future. Besides the extension of secondary school facilities,
it is estimated that the present enrolment of 2.6 million students in
higher educational establishments will triple by 1980.16 All these developments will require construction of many more schools and training of
a large body of teachers, both of which would be facilitated by dip
armament.
45. In the under-developed countries, the magnitude of the educational problem may be seen from the fact that most of them still have
illiteracy rates of we11 over 50 per cent of the population aged fifteen
years and over. The cost of educational requirements in underdeveloped
countries for education is exemplified by a recently adopted African
programme.16 On the basis of inventories of educatmnal needs of the
countries covered by the African plan17 the total cost of the programme
is expected to increase from $590 million in the first year to $1,150
million in 1965, $1,880 million in 1970 and $2,600 million in 1980.
It is assumed that the share of national income devoted to e d u d o n
win rise from 3 to 4 per cent between 1961 and 1965, and thereafter
will increase further, reaching 6 per cent of national income by 1980.
This means that the difference, amount
in the same years to $140
million, $450 millian, $1,010 million
$400 million, respectively,
would need to be covered by foreign aid.
46. Apart from needs in the fields of health and education, there
are urgent requirements for expansion in s o d sm'ces. Even in the
most advanced countries, there are pronounced shortcomings in F e
provision of child welfare services, m t i o n d rehabilitation agenu-,
community centres and other special services.
47. It is thus clear that, so far as socia1 investment is concerned,
there is already a 11eavy backlog of urgent need, and the recent acceleration of population growth and of technical change make it certain that
the need, and the demand, will grow. Social investment therefore is
likely to claim an increasing volume of resources, to which disarmament
would make a welcome contribution.

3

48. The release of scientific and teehnial manpower would be one
of the important consequences of disarmament. Amongst the major
-Based on information in Report on the Prograinme, op. cit., p 66, and N.
Khrushfiev's Report, op. tit., p. 122.
UUnited Nations Eaonornic Commission* for Africa and Unit& Matiws
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organtiatton, O ~ t l i n eof u Phm w A can
Edrrarianol D I Y ~ I O P N I(UNESCOJEDJ180)
X~
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. and Final R e b h (CTNEKO,
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arTheplan covers only thirty-five States and territories of Africa It cxfludts,
in particular, the countries hrdcring on the Mediterrantan and the Un~mof
South Africa.

powers a significant part of the national research and development effort
currently serves military purposes. The total elimination of military
spending would bring about a skble release of resources for civilian
research and development. With disarmament it would thus become
possible to enmurage programmes of h i c scientific research in fields
which have hitherto k e n neglected, and to mobilize great scientific
potential for the solution of some of the world's greatest problems in
such areas as medicine, urban development and reorgamzation, and
the technical problems associated with the economic development of
under-developed countries. If human ingenuity, in the space of a very
few ears, has so vastly increased man's powers for destruction, it
shw d be able to make an equally massive contribution to peaceful and
constructive achievement.
49. Not a11 of the needs described above can be satisfied by
single nations acting alone. In some instances their a a t k f d o f l will
require international co-operation?s Seriws gaps exist in the prmanmt
world-wide network of meteorological observing stations and in the
ccrrresponding telecommunication facilities, and s marked increase is
rquired in the funds available for basic research on irnprovin meteorological services. Furthermare, the funds currently avaih le for
assisting meteorological development in the less developed countries are
far less than needed to satisfy current demands, not to mention prospective demands. TeIecommunications are important to developing
economies and there is need to pursue a number of objectives in this
field, including the development of networks. There is also considerabIe
scope for international co-operation in developing the world's air ttansport facilities.
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50, Disarmament would also open up possibilities for joint international ventures af an even more ambitious kind, including the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful putposes, space research, the exploration of the Arctic and Antarctic for the benefit of mankind and projects
to than e the climates of Iarge areas of the world. Joint restarch into
the eart!'s
interior may lead to discoveries that would be of real value
to the whole world. In addition, joint projects to assist the development
of under-developed countries as well as programmes of co-operation
in the social and economic fields could be undertaken. These international projects could have a major impact on world living standards
and civilrzation.
52. It is evident from the foregoing illustrative discussion of the
magnitude of current and impending needs that the resources freed by
disarmament would not be large enough for the many claims upon them.
Though it wouId take active decisions by Governments in the light of
national and international needs to set in motion the necessary programmes for employing the released resources, it seems abundantly clear
that no country need fear a lack of useful employment opportunities
for the resources that would become available to it through disarmament.
For communications received £rom specialized agencies of the United Nations
on matters discussed in these paragraphs, see volumt I1 of this report (V3593/
Rev,l/Add.l)
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CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACI' OF DIS-

ON NATIONAL
PRODUCTION AND EMPWYMENT

52. Disarmament would raise both general problems of maintaining the over-all Ievd of economic activity and employment and specific
problems in so far as manpower o r productive capacity might require
adaptation to non-military needs. Structural problems of conversion of
the latter type will be discussed in chapter 4. Successful maintenance of
the level of aggregate demand, production and employment would
facilitate the solution of specific structural or frictional problems. Conversely, economic policies which dealt smoothly and effectively with
the structural or frictional problems wwld heIp to promote the solution
of the general problems. In both cases, careful preparation would be
required to ensure that the various stages of the disarmament proFess
were accompanied by as little disturbance of economic life as possrbfe.
53. In the economic life of all countries, shifts in the pattern of
demand and in the allocation of productive resources are continually
occurring in response to changes in technology, foreign trade, consumer
tastes, per capita i n m e , the age distribution of the population, migration, and many other factors. Some industries grow more rapidly than
others, while the outp~itof certain industries m a y even decline in absolute
terms. Such shifts involve a transfer of manpower and capital between
occupations. industries and regions. The rdlocation of productive resources which would accompany disarmament is in many respects merely
a special case of the phenomenon of economic growth.
54. There are, however, some aspects of the process of disarmament which wotild raise probIems significantly different from those that
have been experienced in the usual process of economic growth. While
many of the continuous changes in the composition of demand work
themselves out onIy over a long period of time, it seems reasonable
to assume that disarmament, once degded ilpon, would occur more
rapidly--over a period of only a few years. For some components of
military demand, the whole of the shift mirrht occur within a very short
period of time such as a single year. The reallocation of resources
attendant upon disarmament would therefore pose some special problems.
The more rapid the rate of growth of an economy, however, the easier
it would be to bring about the economic changes disarmament might
require.
55, The conversion of resorlrces that would be required as a result
of disarmament at the present time would be far smaller, in the aggregate. than that which took place at the end of the Second World
War. Thus an examination of the early post-war conversion may help
to give perspective to the present problem. T h e experience of the

smaller-sale conversion that followed the end of the hostilities in Korea
also deserves consideration.

56. The post-war conversion was a much larger one and invol?ed
a more rapid transfer of resources than total disarmament would r e q m
at present. During the last years of the war, the world devoted about we
half of its resources to destruction. The real milibry expenditure and
the number of people in uniform were about four times as high as
today. The extent of devastation in the areas ovenun by armies or
bombed from the air was immense. The usual network of trade both
within and between countries was thoroughty disrupted. Despite these
difficulties, huge armies were quickly dernobrlized without a significant
rise in unemployment in most countries, and the
of m v e r y ,
paiticularly of industrial output, was impressively raprd.
57. During the post-war conversion, the major concern of e ~ +
nomic policy was to restrain, rather than to maintain, over-all demand.
This period was characterized by intense pressure of excess demand for
lmth consumption and invesment. Most commodities were in short
supply. Their distribution was carried out nearly everywhere with the
aid of rationing; or at least under a system of price controls. The wartime acmmalation of liquid savings in the hands of the population
guaranteed a high level of continued e%ective demand. As plant and
equipment were released from war production and repaired or replaced,
they were immediately turned to producing goods far which demand had
remained unsatisfied or deferred in some countries durin nearly fifteen
years of the Great Depression and the war. Most of t5,e demobilized
manpower found employment in civilian at~pations,while the total
labour force declined, reflecting a voluntary withdrawal of some women,
minors and veterans from the labour market. As supply conditions
improved, price and distribution controls were progressively eased
58. There were large arrears not only of consumption but dso
of investment. The capital stock had in many countries been run dawn
by destruction, obso?escence and lack of maintenance. Technological
profless had continued and in fact sharply accelerated in some fields
during the war years. But much of it had remained unincorporated in
plant and equipment--during the depression because of lack of effective
demand, and during the war because of diversion of resources to wartime needs. Residential construction had undergone successive postponement in same countries. These factors led to an upsurce in business
and residential investment after the war, financed in part by the accumulated liquid resources of corporations and of consumers and in
part by various forms of public assistance.
59. In tho United States, by the end of the Second World War,
the military budget had accounted for over 40 per cent of the gross
national prodact. Between I945 and 1946, expenditure on national
security was reduced by 80 per cent. The decline m military expenditure
was equal to one-third of the gross national product and nearly twothirds of ersonaf consumption in 1944. By way of comparison it m a y
be said t t the military budget in the United States in recent years
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has been somewhat less than 10 per cent of the gross national product
and about 15 per cent of personal consumption.

60. The decline in total real demand was less than half the drop
in military spend in^ because of the advance in all other sectors of
demand. The small decline in national output was perhaps no more than
could have been expected as a result of voluntary withdrawals from the
labour force and from the shortening of working hours.
61. The sharpest increase took place in gross Pr;vate domestic
investment which rose from $21 billion to $51 billion--or from less
than 6 per cent of gross national product to about 15 per cent. The rise
in consumption also contributed in absolute terms nearly as much as
investment, although its relative contribution was not so large. There
were also increases in public expenditure for civilian purposes and h
net foreign investment. Assistance f hrough UNRR A, other grants and
credits to various countries for relief and xehabilitation helped toward
a substantid expansion of United States exports. Thus the economy
showed a high degree of flexibility even in the reIatively short run.
62. Between August 1945 and June 1946, the size of the United
States armed forces was reduced by over 9 mi1Iian men. There was a
small reduction in the labour force as women and minors returned to
home and school, and veterans continued their interrupted dueation.
As a result of this, and of the cutting back of overtime, unemployment
in 1946 remained below 4 per cent of the labour force, despite the very
extensive and rapid demobilization.
63. While the large backlog of demand of private business and consumers was responsible for much of the ease with which the post-war
adjustment was made, effective government policies also helped. Taxes
were reduced. There was a very great increase in transfer payments,
principally veterans' cash benefits and payments related to the veterans'
training and dueation programme. As a result, despite the massive
decline in military spending, disposable income fell hardly at all. As
regards investment, a large veterans' loan programme helped to finance
the purchase of homes and farms, quick settlements were made to
business on termination of war contracts, and an easy credit policy was
maintained. The Government of the United States of America notes that:
''Tried tmasures such as these would be under sctive consideration again
in the event of the acceptance of a disarmament progmm!"

64. In e t r g s f e m Europe the conversion process took somewhat
longer than in the United States because of the damage or destruction
to productive facilities and the fact that the total output had in many
cases fa1Im below pre-war Iwels. Inflationary pressures were severe.
Confidence in currencies was shaken. Man key products, notably coal,
steel, certain imported materials, and foo stuffs were in short supply.
65. Despite these difficulties the conversion was relatively rapid.
Eighteen months after the cessation of hostilities, industrial output had
recovered its pre-war level nearly everywhere except in the Federal
Republic of Germany and in Italy. The demobilized armed forces were
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rather quickly absorbed in ernplopent in civilian occupations. Except
in the two countries just mentioned, unempIoymenf declined well below
pre-war levels. The recovery of western Europe was assisted by a considerable amqunt of external aid.
66. In the United Kingdom, it is estimated that at the end of
the war, 9 million persons, or 42 per cent of the total working pop&tion, were either in the armed forces or engaged in the manufacture
of equipment and supplies for them. Sixteen months later, the W
number in these two categories had fallen by almost 7 7 0 n . Of this
total about 1.2 W o n corresponded to a voluntary decline in the hbaur
force, while involuntary unemployment rose by about 0.7 million. Thus
over 5 million people were absorbed into civiliaa em loyment in the
short s ce of sixteen months, whereas the cornpond& number that
would E v e to be absorbed in the event of disarmament m w is just
over 1 million. It is noteworthy that the number unemployed at any one
time never greatly exceeded six or seven weeks' release at the maxirnm
rate reached, and that it stood at this level only so long as r e l w
continued at a substantial rate. Even so, unmpIoyment remained below
4 per cent of the labour force.
67. In some of the undm-developed corcn~es,the post-war recovery resented spacial problems. This was partly because agriculture,
which omed a much Iarger proportion of the output of the underdevebpd than of the developed countries, was g e n W slower to
recover than was industry. The long years of war bad ed in many
cases to heavy exhaustion of farms and livestock and to disturbance of
trading patterns. There was a world shortage of fertilizers, and recovery
was also delayed in many M b-use
initially inadequate industrial,
transport and mining equipment had been strained beyond its rated
capacity during the war. For some time after the war, too, delivery of
equipment was delayed by conversion and re-equipment needs ia the
industrial countries.
68. There is, however, no reason to believe that any future disarmament wouId be attended, in the under-developxi countries, by the
same types of problem as prevailed after the Second World War. As
indicated previously, the main question in these countria would be
whether development programmes could be enlarged and stepped up
cantly--and in sufficiently good tim+to permit the absorption
o the demobilized armed forces and other resources into productive
employment.
69. In the Soviet Union, experience of conversion immediately
following the Second World War was signifiantly different fiom that
in other countries, because of the much greater destruction and devastation which had taken place during the war. Much equipment had k e n
damaged or was in a bad state of repair. Plant and yu~pmentconstructed
during the war had been designed entirely for military purposes, and
was therefore somewhat less "convertible" than facilities constructed in
peace-time. Superimposed on all this was the problem of transferring
workers in the eastern territories-who had been evacuated from areas
occupied by the Germans-back to their home districts in the western
part of the country. For all these reasons there was a decline in industrial
production from 1945 to 1946, concentrated in the producer gwds
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sector. Since some manpower had to be employed in tasks for which it
was untrained there was a decline in output per man. These develop
ments, however, were the result of the devastation and distoation
referred to above. The subsequent recovery was very rapid and 1948
industrid production was already nearly oneafth above the l&level.
The circumstances of any future disarmament would be much more
favourable to a smooth conversion process than those at the end of the
Second World War.
70. In other eartern Euro$ean counties the conversion procw~
had also to overcame heavy human and materid losses caused by the
Second World War. In Pohnd alone, over 6 million people perished
during the war and Nazi ocmpaticm. T h e respective Governments had
to face the great damage caused to productive capacity, transport and
housing, apart from dislocation of rnlations, monetary disturbances
and other difficulties. Recovery was facilitated by the planned diredon
of the process of reconstruction and readjustment which was made
possible by the gradual nationalization of banking, of most industry
and of transportation. The recovery proceeded relatively quickly, so that
in 1948 in most countries the pre-war level of production was surpassed.
C o m s x o ~~ p r s a rTHE KOREANWAI~
71. In the United States at the end of the Korean hostilities many
of the special features associated with demobilization after the Second
World War were no longer present. Military s ~ d i nfell from $62
billion (in 1960 prices) in 1953 to $51 billion m 195 , This was accompanied by a liquidation of inventories that in part was associated
directly with the fall in military expenditure itself, and in part reflected
some business uncertainty regarding the immediate outlook for demand.
The total decline in the national product, however, was less than half
the reduction in miIitary spending, largely because of increases in consumption and domestic investment. The latter, in turn, were made
possible by a reduction in taxes and a policy of monetary ease which
was particularly important in stimulating expenditure on housing. Unemployment, after rising to 5.6 per cent of the labour force in 1954,
defined to less than 4.4 per cent in 1955 in the h e of further cutbacks
in milikry spending.
72. Characterizing the eflflectivenessof policies during this period,
the Government of the United States of America observes that:
"Despite the mildness of the 1954 recession it now is clear that f i d
and monetary policies might have been applied with more oigor. The reaaon
they were not is that the decline in ddence spending following the Korean

f

War was not treated by the policy makers as a major demobilization requiring
strong compeasatory a c h For this reason the 1953-1954 period does not
provide a significant guide to the behavior of the American economy in a
disarmament program during the 196[rs!*

73. In other countries, for which information is available, the
degree of involvement in the Korean war was not such that its end
provided experience of comparable relevance for the purpose of this
study. With the cessation of hostilities in Korea, however, there was
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a diminution of international tensions which brought about reductions
in military expenditure and releases from armed forces in various
countries. No significant problems of reabsorption of the demobilized
personnel arose in these countries.

'
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74 The experience of the centrally planned economies in reducing
the armed forces is also of interest. In the Soviet Union, the armed
forces were reduced from 5.8 miliion men in 1955 to 3.6 million men
in 1958.8 There were also reductions in rnilitaq forces in other centrally
pIanned economies during that period. No s~gnificantproblems were
created by the demobilization in these countties since the demand f?r
labour was continually increasing. Discharged &ars were absorbed III
administrative posts in industry or agriculture and were pmvided with
opportunities for retrainig at government expense. In a number of
countries in eastern Europe, expansion in output of durable consumer
ds was greatly facilitated after 1954 by utilizing the equipment which
earlier been devoted to producing armaments.

&

75, National experience with general economic policies during
previous conversion periods will unquestionably be valuable for policy
d e r s in the future. In adopting a programme of general and complete disarmament, Governments would certainly wish to assess very
carefully the probable impact of disarmament on national production
and employment, and to examine their economic policies to ensure that
these were as well thought out as possible. It would be important to
maintain a high general level of domestic demand for goods and services
and thereby to support satisfactory levels of output and employment.
This is already a well-established objective of national @icy, but it
would have additional urgency both during the conversion period and
also in the long run, after generat and complete disarmament had been
achieved.
76. The economic measures needed to maintain over-all effective
demand are different in the p r i ~ t eenterprise economies from those
in the centrally planned economies. In the latter, economic decisionmaking is centralized. Most of the productive capacity is governmentowned. The national economic plans are directed toward the achievement of a set rate of growth and higher levels of living. In the private
enterprise economies, on the other hand, where the private sectors are
much larger than the government sectors, the power to make economic
decisions is diffused. Governments must therefore rely heavily, in
influencing economic decision-making in the private consumption and
investment sectors, on relatively indirect means such as fiscal and
monetary policies. In generat, the governments of under-developed
countries cannot count as readily as those of the more developed m n tries on an expansion of private investment. Greater attention needs
*Then &a a govtnrmmt decision for a further d d o n to 2.4 million men
in 1960. Statement by PPtne Minister h h c h e v reported in Pr15 ]annary
1960.
,
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therefore to be given to undertaking whatever volume of expenditure
may prove neces.sary in the governmentmed sector in the underdeveloped countmes.
77. Much attention has already been given in the iltdussriafked
privuk e
n
t
e
r
w
e ecosomks to the methods by which total effective
demand a n be maintained. Member countries are pledged under the
United Nations Charter to maintain full employment. A number of
Governments have further undertaken in national statements of policy
to adopt measures toward that objective, The instruments available
for the prevention of any substantial shortfall of demand are well
known. Their relative merits, however, vary widely from one country
to another and from one time to another because of diffexences in
institutions and attitudes.
78. The nature and magnitude of the task of maintaining total
demand at an adequate level to assure the ftrllest possible employment
would depend to some extent upon the purpose to which the resources
released from military use were applied. In some cases, it might be
decided to use the released resourws by reducing taxes on income,
particularly of lower income groups. In others, it might be decided to
reduce the burden of indirect taxes on mass consumption goods borne
mainIy by the lower income groups in the carnmunity, It might, also,
be seen fit to adopt fiscal measures designed to stimulate investment
expenditure. Tn yet other cases importance might be attached to reduction of the public debt. Alternatively, a decision might also be taken
to replace military expenditure by other kinds of government expenditure. These digwent policies would have different impacts upon
the level of effective demand. In practice, different combinations of
them would be IikeIy to be used in different countries.
79. Disarmament would lead to an inmediate reduction of effective
demand only in so far as total expenditure of the government-owned
sector were reduced. It might seem at first sight that this resuIt would
be avoided if tax revenue were reduced by the same amount as government expenditure, but this is not, in general, the case, since some of the
increased disposabte income would be saved rather than spent. The
effect on consumption would depend on which type of tax were reduced,
whether direct or indirect, and on which income poup were affected.
Generally, reduction in taxes diminishing the burdens on low income
p u p s are the most effective. Even so, however, some fall in income
would result under these assumptions. A setback of this kind, unless
counteracted by other measures, might also discourage private investment and thus lead to a further fall in income.
80. It should, perhaps, be observed that in so far as it is desired
to raise private consumption, the appropriate means cannot lie exclusively in reductions in direct iaxation because those benefited by
such a measure do not include the poorest sectors of the population whose
incomes are too low to be taxed. Supplementary measures of various
types would be required to ensure that all prts of the communi
benefited to some extent from the higher consumption levels ma e
possible by disarmament.
81. The effect of using the money saved by a reduction of military
acpenditure for repaying public debt would be twofold. On the one

a

hand government expenditure on gmds and services would be lower,
since debt rqm ent does not in itself constitute a direct offset to the
reduction in mi&
spending. On the other hand, by substituting holdings of money for ho dings of public debt some private spendmg on
goads and services would probably be stimulated. The extent of this
stimulation is difficult to assess, and would vary with the kind of debt
redeemed, but it would be unlikely to offset the deflationary impact of
the original reduction in government expenditure.
82. Monetary and fiscai policy could be used to offset the &ect
of a shortfall in total demand that might result from a decline in government expenditure. Monetary policy, whether operated mainly through
interest rates or mainly through a more direct control of credit, @yes
some sco for the encouragement of both capital formation by business
and purckes of durable goods by consumers. Changes in taxation, or
transfers, in addition to their immediate effects on purchasing power,
to which some reference has already been made, may a h be expected
to exert some influence on the formation of business capital; t a x concessions may be designed to encouyge private investment in
or to give special encouragement to investment in particular in ustxies
or localities where it will most effectively employ resources former1y
in military use. Moreover, although in some countries there are severe
limits to the extent to which it is practiwble to use unbalanced budgets
as a means of adjusting the level of dective demand, such measures,
where they are acceptable, are powerful instruments for this purpose.
Tax revenue might be deliberately reduced by more than the nd
reduction in government expenditure brought about by disarmament.
In some countries, the changes that have already taken place in the
net budget balance of the government sector within small numbers of
years appear to have been of the same order of magnitude as those that
might be required to offset a shortfall of demand consequent upon
disarmament.
83. If a shortfall of effective demand m n o t be fully dealt with
by the foregoin methods, there always remains the possibility of an
increase in civifan government expenditure designed at least in part
to help in solving this problem. Expenditure on goods and services is,
in general, likely to be more effecbve for this purpose than transfer
e x p e n d h e t h e increase of grants and subsidies to various sections
of the community-but in the not unlikely event of the recipients being
disposed to spend marly all the a s h benefits they receive, the difiewould be small.
84. The instruments of adjustment @erred to above are more
highly developed, easier to bring into operation, and may be expected to
work more effectively in some countries tban in others. Bearing ia
mind, however, that a substantial part of military expenditure would
probably be r laced by other overnment expenditure in most countries,
it may be con uded from the oregoing paragraphs that the maintenance
ofeffective demand in the face of disarmament should not prove di3icuft.
Indeed, it should be practicable not merely to maintain the level of
demand during the transition period, but to move f o m d to the more
rapid growth in total real income that a transfer of resources from
military use to productive invesbnent would render physidy po~&le.
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85. It has been argued that in so far as disarmament might lead
to a reduction in the relative size of the governeat sector, the s t d d k h g
effect that the existence of a substantial public sector exercises upon

the general level of activity might be diminished. Military expenditure,
however, has itself been notoriously subject to variations wbsch,
unconnected with the requirements of stabilization policy, have distur
the level of activity in the economies in question and in the world as a
whole. Disarmament need not therefore increase the d i d of economic stabilization, even if it should lead to a fall in the r tive size
of the government sector.
a. For many under-develojed c o u ~ t r k s ,the effect of d i ment upon the industrial countries' demands for primary products, and
thus on the export earnings of the primary producing countries, would
be of great importance. So would the methods of dealing with the
Iiquidation of strategic stockpiles. These problems are &sassed in
chapter 5. It is necessary to add here that the industrial countries' sucm s in mainkinin effective demand during the immediate period of
disarmament wouI be of great concern to all primary producing countries. The significance of disarmament for an expamion of aid to underdeveIoped countries is dealt with in chapter 6.
87. The effects of disarmament within the underdweloped couatries themselves would vary from one to another. In some cases, the
ratio of the military budget to the gross domestic product is of the
same order of magnitude as in the major military powers (4-10
cent). In the majority of cases (including most of the larger un erdeveloped countries), it is less than 4 per cent. So far as growth mtes
are concerned, however, the effects of the release for non-milita?;
purposes of these proportions of the national resources, whether
or low, might be greater than the figures would by themselves suggest.
Both total capital formation and government expenditure are generally
smaller in relation to gross domestic product in the under-developed
countries than in the richer ones. The ratio of military e n d i m r e
to gross domestic capital formation in the majority of under-developed
countries for which the data exist lies in the same range I0 per cent
and upward) as in the majority of other countries. Thus e contribution of disarmament to their economic growth would be very substantial.
88. Underdeveloped countries usually obtain their supplies of
munitions from abroad either as direct purchases or as grants under
military agreements ot bath. To the extent that these imports are
received without payment, their cessation would have little economic
impact on under-developed countries. On the other hand, to the extent
that these imports have required the expenditure of foreign exchange,
disarmament would make it possible to reallocate foreign exchange
to imports of capital goods and of other equipment needed for economic
growth. There are, however, a few countries which have been receiving
considerable foreign exclxmge from foreign military aid and milImy
expenditure including the outlays of foreign personnel. In consequwce,
it is important that any disarmament programme should include measures to relieve the strain on the external balances of such countries.
89. Reductions in the military budgets of most underdeveloped
wuntries would have their main effects through the reduction of man-
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power in the armed forces and the assodated decrease in I
d expenditure on the products used by the armed forces. The release of
unskilled military personnel would to some extent aggravate the already
difficult problems of unemployment and under+inpbyment. On the
other hand, the members of the armed forces in the under-developed
countries are frequently tetter provided with potentially useful skills
than the rest of the population. The more skilled men should be easier
to absorb into productive employment and their absorption should contribute substantially to the development of the economy.
90. As was pointed out above with respect to the industrialized
private enterprise economies, the maintenance of the level of efiective
demand may require sustain~ngthe level of governmmt expenditure.
This consideration appears to apply with greater force to the underdeveloped countries, where tax reduction may be less effective in
stimulating private expenditure than it is in the more developed economies. The need to plan alternative government expenditure would
therefore be particularly great.
91. In the cerrtrally plumed bcosomies, the maintenance of effective demand while reducing military expenditure would be simply
a matter of efficiency of planning techniques. Since decisions cancerntng
the production of military output as well as *of investment and consumer goods are co-ordinated through the nat~onaleconomic plan, the
substitution of one type of expenditure for another does not raise any
basic problems for the maintenance of effective demand. The reply
from the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic indicates
that this can be accomplished by certain adjustments in the current
economic plans without necessitating the establishment of any special
economic institutions. The effect of the decline in armaments expenditure
could be largely offset b corresponding increases in investment in
plant and equipment and or other purposes such as housing as well as
by increases in personal consumption. A rise in personal consumption
could be brought about by a reduction in taxatron corresponding in
magnitude to that part of armament expenditure which was not replaced
by investment.
92. In consequence, effective demand could be readily maintained, and the principal problems of conversion would concern the
physical adaptatian of plants producing armaments to the produetion of
goods for civilian use. The problems of reallocation of resources are
discussed in some detail in the reply from the Government of the Polish
People's Republic.' It is indicated that the period of short-term transition m a y be divided into three major stages. In the first stage, the
main concern would be to utilize the existing military fmed assets and
skilled manpower for facilitating an increase in the output of civilian
goods and services. The role of new investment and development of
additional supplies of raw materials would be reIatively minor. It is
suggested that the warehouses, transport and communications equipment,
repair shops and other capital equipment and raw materials used for
military purposes would be converted as far as technical1 possible to
the production of civilian goods. Military personnel wit specialized
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*See the reply of tht Government of the Polish People's Rcpnblic.
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lugher education would be transferred to civilian functions in the wmmts of health, education and d a l services.
93. The second stage involves an ex
ion of plant and equipment, in which there is relatively i t n i t s no excess u p c i t y at
resent, for the absorption of the manpower released from mihtary use.
L c u l a r attention would have to be paid to overcoming the shortages
of raw materials that might develop. For this urpose, an increase in the
domestic output of there commod~tieras welfas in =ports to p y for
imports would be called for. With an adequate expansion of productive
capacities and of the raw materials base, it would then be possible in
the third stage to reap the full benefits of conversion-in the form of
a higher rate of growth of the economy and of levels of living than is
currently envisaged.

CHAPTER 4

STRUCTURAt PROBLEMS OF CONVJ3RSION
94. Even with the successful maintenance of total effective demand
during a period of disarmament, significant problems of adjustment
would remain in specific sectors and areas of the economy. Part of the
personnel released by the armed forces and the armaments industry
would have to be trained or retrained so as to permit absorption into
peacetime occupations. Some plant and equipment would have to be
converted. Productive apacity might contract in some industries, and
might have to be expanded in others. Where the manufacture of
armaments has been concentrated in particular regions, it would be
necessary either to shift resources out of those regions to other areas
of growng demand, or alternatively to undertake schemes of redevehp
m a t . The necessary steps w d d have to be takento modify the diredm
of research and of technological development.
95. It has alrady been suggested that the broad roblem of readaptation of industry and manpower resulting from &armament is
not basically dissimilar from that experienced in the normai process
of economic growth. For example, a decline in demand for coal in
western Europe and North America has created special problam in
the d mining communitia. The position in some of the textile towns
is similar. In the centrally planned economies, problems of this type
can be handled by planning. In private enterprise economies, where
adjustments may be delayed because of such dramstanm as immobility of some labour or capital and rigidity of prices, they can be
dealt with by special government rnmrts.
96. The higher the rate of growth of the economy, the easier the
p m s s of adaptation. I n the longer run, disarmament would allow
each country to raise the rate of investment and to adapt productive
mpacity more adequately to the needs of the population and to the
requirements of economic growth, both in the p v a t e enterprise and the
centrally planned economies.
97. In the shorter run, the smoothness of the transition would
largely depend on the ability of Governments to anticipate the types
of problem that might arise, and on the adequacy of preprations, This
calls for an adequate assessment of the direct and indirect demands of
military expenditure on each industrial sector and region, and of the
extent to which a replacement of military by other expenditure would
involve a modification of the structure of demand. Such a confrwtation
of milita demands and of civilian alternatives mn be wried out in
detail on y by national Governments. The present discussion sets out
only some of the more important considerations involved.
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98. The resources now supplying military requireme- could bc
adapted to peacetime needs partly by shifts within industries and plants,
and partIy by shifts between industries.
(a) Shifts within i~dust&s & pbnts. In a large number of
cases, it may be pssible for a given plant to shift the nature of the
end-product from military quipment to durable consumer goods and
investment p d s while usin4 the same productive equipment and manpower. For ~nstance,there mlght be a shift from tanks ta tractors, from
military to civilian aircraft, from naval vessds to merchant ships, or
from electronic equipment for military purpses to television sets. This
might be a relatively easy procedure, in many cases involving little more
than changes in designs, retooling, and minor adaptations of skills,
particularly in plants and enterprises which already produce both
military and civilian goods.
(b) S h i s b&em hd*s.
Other cases, however, might d l
for a more complex form of conversion requiring the output of some
industries to be completely stopped or sharply curtailed and that of
others to be correspondingly expanded. Many ordnance factories might
cease to produce altogether. In same countries, the total output of
airmft, ships and boats would have to be reduced sin= civilian
demand far such products would not fully oftset the fall in military
d-d.
On the other hand, a considerable expansion of output in the
cement, brick, glass and building industries might be reqdred should
there be a shift in expenditure in favour of civilian construction. Shifts
of this trpe cannot be accommodated within the same plant but require
instead a movement of resources from one industry to another.
99. Shifts between industiies w d d necessitate acquisition of
different types of ski11 bv the working force as well as new investment in
plant and equipment. They would take a somewhat langer time to
accompIish than shifts within industries, the lenp$h of time depending
on how m j o r or far-removed were the shifts. If the two industries were
to have a similar resource content--as do the aircraft industry and the
pneral engineering industry, for insianc-he
adaptation would be
easier and would &ke a shorter time than if the two industries were to
differ simifitantly in resource content-as do the aircraft indusw and
the buitding materials industry, for example. The extent to which the
conversion would involve shifts within industries and plants as apposed
to Bifts betweerr industries can be judged from studies made in a
nt~rnberof countries.

THEPROBLEM OF INTER-IMPUSTRY SHXFTS
100. In the United Statss, owing to t h mneentratioh
~
of military
apenditure in a limited number of mdustnes, only a few industries
would be aEected sharply by reductions in military demand. Professor
Leontief has prepared a hypothetical study of the inter-industrial ram%ations of conversion in the United States on tho assumption that
military expenditure is replaced wboIly by inmasa in expenditure on
other Idnds of ods and services m proportion to their shares in total
demand in 195fl Such a reallootion of military qenditure would
W.-ti$
and Y. H&&rg,
"The Economic Ed- of Disarmamtnt",
S&ed& A m o n (New York), v d 204, NO.4, A p d 1961, pp. 4735.

1,320,000em loyees from the contractky industries for tmloyment elsewhere. ver four-fifths of the decline m
loyment would
(which hc udes missiles),
in four industri-ircraft
and
radio, ordnance, and ships and boats g a n n a 3,table 3-11. Employment would be totally eliminated in the ordnance industry and would
fall by more than 90 per cent in the aircraft and prts industry; expansion of demand for civilian aircraft would have only a minor influence cn output in the latter industry.
101. In addition to the 1,32l,000 employees released from contracting industries, the 2,530,000 members of the armed fotcw and
about 790,000 civilian employees of military agenda would b
e
available for alternative employment. n u s , about 4.5 million persons
.-some 6 or 7 per cent of the total labour force in employment xn 1958
-wouldy on these assumptions, have to change their emplopmmt from
I
one industry group to another or find civilian instead of military employment.
102. Professor h n t i e f estimates the number absorbed into expanding sectors to be some 600,000 less than that released from the
I
military establishment and the contracting industries. This difference,
taken literally, would h p l y that an increase of about 1 per cent in t d
government and private expenditure, spread over tbe duration of
disarmament process, would be required to preserve the
traf l e d
of employment. It is, however, a residual figure which shou d be treated
with reserve, since it is less than the margin of error of this hypotheticat
caIculation.
103. A similar calculation, though with less narrow1 defined industry groups, has been made far the United Kirtgdom {y Professor
J. R. N. Stone and his colleagues of the University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics. The assumption in this case is that
military expenditure is replaced as to one-third by iflaeased private
consumption expenditure, one-third by fixed capital formation at home,
and one-third by increased foreign aid. The only industrial g m p in
.which output (and hence employment) is estimated to decline is that
including the manufacture of ships and aircraft, in which the fail is
about 20 per cent (see annex 3. table 3-2). Including the members of
the armed forces themselves, and civilian employees of the military establishment, the number of persons r e q u i d to change their "industry
group" would be about 9W000,or between 3% and 4 per cent of the
labour force.
104. In both cases, these mlculations indicate the numbers who
wodd have to move from one industry to another (or out of direct
military employment) in the went of wry rapid disarmament. If the
'
operation were to extend over a number of years, the change per
annum would be only a fraction of the total. Moreover, a substantial
proportion of the shrinkage in the armed forces and in the contracting
industries might take place through the normal process of turnover,
thereby diminishing the number of persons actually required to move
from one kind of employment to another.
105. T h e replies received from a number of 0 t h cousfrrfrr~s
of
wesfem Esrrops indicate that the problem of shifts from one industry
release
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to another would be a relatively srnalI one? According to these replies,

the rate of economic growth is now S i t e d by labour shortages and it
could be accelerated if manpwer were released from military uses.
f 06. Under-dmloped cou~ltriesgeneraIly have been meeting their

requirements for military goods and services by imports, so that their
disarmament would release foreign exchange rather than industrial
workers. As indicated in chapter 3, it would also free members of the
forces with many useful skills and training. Some of these would be
absorkd by the growing labour market; others could be usefully employed in the development of social capital by construction of minor
~rrigationworks, feeder-roads and other community development projects, which would help to mitigate the already acute problem of underdevelopment.
107. In some of the sepni-industPioEked c o v ~ t r i e s , however, the
newly started basic industries which manufacture, for example, chemid
fertilizers, heavy machine tools, heavy vehicles, aircraft and electronic
equipment, have been serving both military and civilian needs. In the
event of disarmament these industries could concentrate, without any
transitional difficulty, on the manufacture of capital goods so urgently
needed for both consumer goods industries and capital goods industries.
Transport eapacity, particularly vehicles, released fmm military uses,
would stlppIement the inadequate transport facilities available in the
present stage of their development.
108. In the central!y planmed eronomks, as indicated previously,
productive capacity is usually fully utilized. Thus it would be necessary
to convert plants producing military equipment to production of durable
consumer goods and of such investment goods as can be produced
in them with only minor retooling. Such conversion could be achieved
rapidly. Many plants producing military equipment produce also certain
goods for civiIian purposes. In Poland, for instance, pIants which manufacture military equipment also account for about SO per cent of the
national output of motor cycles and scooters, 80 per cent of the sewing
machines. 70 pet cent of the washing machines and 30 per cent of the
refrigerators produced in the country.= The reply of the Government
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic mentions experience with conversion of a number of plants from miHtary production to production
of medium-sized trucks, tractors and television sets, in d l of which no
more than 3 to 4 per cent of the productive equipment was found to
be unutilizable after con~ersion.~
109. In the longer run, disarmament would make possible substantial increases of investment, so that the more adequate adaptation
of productive capacity to the needs of the population and to the r uirements of eeonornie growth muld proceed fairly rapidly. In ~ o k 8for
.
instance, it is estimated that total disarmament would allow the total
amount of capital investment to rise by over 9 per cent a s compared
with the level of 1%2P In Bulgaria an increase of investment by I0

Set volume If of this report (E/3593/Rev.l/Add.l).

*a
the reply of the Government of the Polish Peo le's Republic

the
of the h e m m a t ~ l czFchostoMe
e
Socidiat ~epubr*.
'See the reply of the Governmat of the Pohsh People's &public, Addtndmn.
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would be possible in consequence of dhmamtnt.6 A
considerable increase in investment would also take place in Hungary?
110. The replies of the Governments of the centrally planned
economies state that there will be no djf6culty in absorbing r e l d
manpower. In countries such as Czechoslovakia, the German Demwmtic
Republic and Hungary, the supply of labour in recmt ~s
has not
kept pace with growing labour requirements. In P o h d ~tis estimated
that in the next few years the increase of the industrial l a b f o r e
will be drawn mainly from the natural i r ~ of
m the urban population
with relatively little influx of workers from agriculture to industry. In
these circumstances it would appear that demobilization of man wer
might slow down the transfer of labour from agriculture to in ustry.
But the increase of investment following disarmament would raise considerably the requirement of labour for industry and e
~ The
final effect, therefore, would be to stimulate rather than to slow down
the transfer of labour from agriculture to industry. In the Soviet
Union the absorption of demobiked personnel would be gratly fadlitated by the growing demand for manpower in the rapidly -ding
eastern territories. The construction of new industrial centres and the
expansion of cultivation of l u ~ din the less populated A s i a n p of the
Soviet Union, particularly in Siberia, has generated a emand for
labour which cannot be fully met by local resources. Migration to these
territories is being encouraged and d h m a m n t w d d prwide a
welcome source for addition to the manpower required.
to 12 per cent

cr

111. The precedin anaIysis of the changes resulting from the
prmess of reallocation o military expenditure to other urposes su
gests ttnt the net rhihs in employment am^ output mu1 b~ relativeki
a n d . As already indicated, however, special problems would arise
from a concentration of the military effort in certain industries or areas.
These problems may be broadly classified as follows:
(i) Adaptation of skills to peace-time requirements.
(ii) Problems of assistance to particular enterprises, industries
and localities, heavily oriented to military use.
(iii) Reorientation of research and techndogicaI development.
(i) Adapt&
of $Kills
112. In some instances, the skills that are essential for d c e
in the armed forces or in some of the major industries praduciug
military p o d s may not be readily adaptable to the requirements of
civilian employment. Consequently, there would arise a n
q to
revain part of tbe skilled manpower and to train some of the unskrlIad
a) Amted pwsmnd a d mpluy$es in the Mijeirby of
ll3. ost of the officers in modern armed forces have received
Dgfmce.
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training that would fit them easily for techaid, engineering, medid
and similar posts in civilian life. As the reply of the Guvemment of
the United States of America indicates, 85 per cent of the commissioned
offictrs in that country have corn leted gome form of college training.
However, some of the senior o cers in the armed forces have been
traiued for purposes significantly different from those that are needed
in civilian life. A special effort would have to be made to find suitable
q l o y m e n t for them. Some of them might be d l e d on to serve in
mrlous =pacities in the international organs to be set up for control
of disarmament. %me wouId find useful occupations in civilian activities
where their organizational abilities may be a special requirement. Since
the number of officers is usually not very large, it should not be hard
to absorb them into civilian life.
114. The demobilization of the non-prokssional members of the
armed forces would involve a much larger number of persons. But
most of these men have been drawn from civiIian life where they were
p r w i w s l ~engaged in non-military occupations. They are usually young
and relauvely mobile. Military service has often interrupted their education. In many cases, however, they have acquired new technical skills
while in military service. In most of the underdeveloped countries, the
regular armed forces possess a much higher level of industrial and
technical skilb than the civilian pulation; this would tend to
them a relatively greater chance o being absorbed into civilian emp oymcnt, particularly in an expnding economy.
115. The release of the armed forces, over some years, wodd
imply only that the number of new entrants for that M o d wodd be
augmented by this special factor. In some countries, particularly in
Europe,which are faced with shortages of manpower, the availability
of a larger labour force could indeed c o n ~ b u t eto an acceleration of
the rate of economic growth. Moreover, the financial resources r e l a d
by di-ent
should make it possible to arrange for &nation
pay
and special allow~nwsfor various types of training. For i-ce,
the
Government of the United States carried out, after the' Second World
War,a lar e programme for education, training and job placement for
demobiliz army personnel. Nearly 8 million veterans took advantage
of the training programme. Similar1 , 2 million, or one-third of the
eIi@bIe veterans of the Korean war ave benefited from such training
facilities!
116. The reply of the Government of the Polish People's Republic
indicates the magnitudes involved in re-employing the non-professional
members of the armed forces. It is anticipated that a majority of the
draftees from rural areas would return to the countryside to help in
the projected intensification of agriculture. Some 20 to 30
cent are
expected to be employed in plants which now produce mi 'tary equipmmt but m l d immediately be converted to produce investment goods,
-port commodities and raw materials. This would further facilitate the
productive employment of the remainder.
117. (b) Imdwtries prodacing military goods. As pointed out
above, the problem of conversion in the industrial countriesBis likely
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to be a short-term one for most industries. In industries de nd'
h a i l on m i l k y orders, many of the employees possess a eve1 o
skill &at should find gainful employment in other branches of produetion,1° so long as over-all effective demand is ris' Momvex, wbere
some form of retraining or additional trai-f
be needed for anpl ment, it could be acquired through the acrllhes for apprenticeship
an on-the-job training often provided by individual firms or plants for
their new labour force. Even so, there might k some s ial cases
which would require speciaI assistance to emowage the a aptation of
EMIto
Snew jobs. Such help couId be provided through opportunities
for vocational training financed by such meam as termhation pay or
other special measures.
118. In this age of automation the demand for highly skilled
labour is rising faster than the demand for semi-skilled and unskiUed
Therefore a significant number of those who would be released in the
latter categories might be faced with difficult problems, particularly
if they were of an advanced age. While the experience of a much more
extensive demobilization and conversion at the end of the Second
World War suggests that the roblems thus arising are by no means
insuperable, governments shou d stand ready to assist the reabsorption
of such workers into productive employment.
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(ii)

Particular ewtsrp&s
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119. Owing to the concentration of military output in a few
industries, termination of military contracts would bear specially upon
the activities of particular enterprises. These would have a choice of
three courses of action : complete shutdown, the adaptation of existing
plant and equipment to the production of other p a d s throu h major
retooling, and investment in entirely new plants. Similar pro 1 m s an
a much larger scale were faced at the end of the last war and tackled
with a considerable degree of success.
120. The geographical distribution of the actiw based on
military expenditure is very uneven in m y urmtrks. &e
merits necessitated by disarmament woyld thefeforc impinge parhcu rly
heavily on certain areas and l d t i e s . Varlous forms of public and
other mistance would thus prove necessary to facilitate readjustment.
Measures of three types would be required. First, attempts shouId be
made to diversify the strudre of employment by developing new
industries where possible. Secondly, adequate relmtion allowances
should be provided to facilitate the movement of those who are mobile to
areas where the labour market is expanding. Thirdly, adquate relief
should be granted to those whose attachment to the locality 1s too deep
or whose age is too advanced to contemplate moving to other arms.
The costs of the necessary measures would be very small in relation to
the resources that disarmament would release.
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(iii) Reo&nfah'on of rgsearch a d tschnologicd d e w o l o ~ t
121. In the centrally planned economies Governments have always
played a major role in promoting research and development. In the
private enterprise economies also, this role has expanded everywhere in
recent years, particularly through the growth of research for military
purposes. In the United Kingdom, direct military expenditure is
responsible for nearly two-fifths of the total spent on research and
developent. ApproximateIy half of the research and development
effort m the United States is financed out of the military budget; this
part of research is highly concentrated in a few industries.
122. The magnitude of the task of shifting scientific and technid
personnel to non-military fields of research would differ from country
to country, but the estimates that have been made for the United States
may have some relevance elsewhere. In that wuntr expenditure on
research and development is six to seven times higter
dollar af
military demand than per d o h r of final civilian demand. Therefore,

on the hypothetical assumption of an unchanged proportional allmation
of fun& to science by the civilian sector, the reply of the Government

of the United States of America estimates that a redomtion of total
military expenditure to civilian purposes would lead to a reduction
of about 40 per cent in spend~ngfor research and development. T h e
corresponding decline in the, employment of scientific personnel would
amount to only half the decline in research and development spending,
or about 20 per cenLIP
123. No reduction in the actual employment of scientific and
technical personnel need be feared! however, because the demand far
civilian research would i n c r y e rap~dly.Indeed, one of the main reasons
why scientific research is st~llfar from adequately applied in many
c i d i fields is the fact that highly qualified personnel have been
scarce, and have been pre-empted by military demands. A more ade uate
supply of specialists would make it possible to o p n u new fid%sof
inquiry, hitherto virtually neglected, as well as to devote &,ger resources
to existing lines of scientific investigation in both the develop& and
underdeveloped countries. The scope for peaceful research in the
physical, chemical, biological and human sciences is unfimited, a d the
potential benefits to the whole of humanity incalculable.
See the reply of the GoPernment of the United Statcs of America.
Tbe smaller decline in employment is,due +part to
fact that the. material#
and tquipmmt -tent of rcsparch expendlhlres is mueh.h@wr for milrmilrtary
than
for aviIian m c h and in part to the fact that more scleutists and W n e e r s arc
required in posts not directly connected with reaearch and deveIopment in the
noalnilitary industries than in the military.

CHAPTER 5

TEE IMPACT OF DISAmMMENT ON INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC REWI"I'0HS
124. Disarmament would be bound to have favourable effects on
the development of international economic relations. The politid
dikn te that would accompany an international disarmament programme
would in itself imply that nations were willing to reconsider their
economic relations with one another. The consequent relaxation of
international tensions would provide a sound h t s for reduction ,of
trade barriers and for modifimtion of existing trade agreements and
trading practices. In the long run this would encourage an expansion of
international trade, a more rational international division of labour and
a more effective use of the world's resources. In the short term it might
help conversion by enerating new demand for exports from existtng
sources of supply t t could be satisfied fairly easily from existing
capacities.
125. The relaxation of international tension would benefit trade
through the elimination of the concern with national defence as a factor
affecting national trade policies. The needs of national defence have long
been accepted as a legitimate reason for the pursuit of discriminatory
and protectionist po1icies.l Among the justifications advanced for the
protection of agriculture and mining in many industrial countries has
been the need to guarantee an adequate national supply af food and raw
materials. In many instances, the domestic production of manufactured
goods, as well, has been promoted on security grounds, to the detriment
of international trade. Security is not the only consideration in such
cases, and may not even be the decisive one; nevertheless, it carries
considerable weight with Governments at the present time. After disarmament, however, its force would be lost, and an opprtunit would
be afforded to re-examine and improve the framework of word trade,
126. An important aspect of this matter is trade between the
centrally planned economies and the rest of the world. Although this
trade has been rising in relation to world trade in recent years, its
share is still low in comparison with the levels prevailing before the
Second World War and, especially, in comparison with the share of
these economies in world output and with the levels that could be
achieved under favourable conditions in the future. The centtaIly
planned economies are expanding rapidly and form a growing market,
particularly for durable producers' goods and raw materials. At the
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'It is true that at certain times national security considerations have led to
higher trade flows in particular directions than might otherwise have taken place;
strategic stockpiIing, for exampIe, h
i stimulated purchases of some commodities.
However, this stimulus has not been an unmixed bIessing, and in any
stackpiling is no longer signi6cant in worfd trade.
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a source of supply to the
rest of the world for certain primary products and manufactures. The
obstales that stand in the way of cIoser economic relations between
state trading and private enterprise economies are not basically of a
technid character. To a considerable extent they reflect mutual lack
of confidence. A lessening of international tensions and a rebuilding
of coddence wouM help to remove them.
127. Disarmament would bring about a change in the camposition
and rate of growth of output and thus affect the structure and rate of
expansion of world trade. While the composition of the non-military
production that would replace military output cannot be precisely
foreseen, it appears to be a safe assumption that all the main mtegories
of civilian output would increase their share in national product. In w
far as hereased investment and greater economic aid would accelerate
tlie rate of economic growth in developed and under-developed countries,
a more rapid mpansion of world trade could be anticipated. However,
there are more immediate eEects that might follow the shift in demand;
these hinge on the difference between the import content of military
expenditure and the import content of the increments to consumption,
investment and foreign aid that disarmament would facilitate.
128. It is possible in principle to estimate the import content of
any country's military expenditure, as well as of the civilian expenditure
tbat would replace it, by means of an analysis of an economy's interindustry structure. Such an analysis would indicate whether a shift
from military wcpenditure to, say, housing construction would result in
a net.increase or a net decrease in the demand for imports both in the
=regate and for specific commodities,
129. Some exports of priniary prodttcts, such as petroleum, rubber
and most metallic ores depend significantly at present on direct and
i n d i e demand generated by military purchases. An estimate of this
dependence with respect to the United States economy is summarized in
annex 3, table 3-3. These figures show, for instance, that the direct
and indiiect demand for copper generated by United States military
expenditure in 1958 amo~~nted
to 7.8 per cent of that year's total worId
asupply and to 7.4 per cent of the supply in 1959. On the assumption
that the demand generated by the combined military outlays of all
industrialized countries may be abut twice as large as that computed
for the United States alone, the table indicates that some 15-16 per
cent of world copper output has served, directly and i n d i r d y , military
purposes (see columns 3 and 4). For tin, nickel, lead and zinc the
corresponding figure is over 9 per cent : for petroleum, between 8 and
9 per cent. In view of the wdl-known sensitivity of the prices of these
products to changes in demand, the elimination of all armament expenditure. if there were m offsetting rise in civilian demand, could have
a seriousIy adverse effect on the income of those underdeveloped countries whose exports consist largely of such raw materials.
130. Table 3 4 (in annex 3) shows, however, that the demand
of tbe United States and of the world far these raw materials wwid
be reduced only ftactionally-by less than 2 per mt-if the efimination
of military expenditure were accompanied by a corresponding increase
in private and public non-militarg expenditure. These hflothetica]
same time, they are capable of serving as

estimates, it should be noted, are based on the assumption h t rivate
ammmpion, investment, non-military government purchuu
other
catemnes of nonlnilitary demand would all inin the same proportion. However, since the content of these raw materials in military
production does not differ significantly from that of the most im
categories of non-military production, the impact on over-all emand
for the items listed in the table would appear to be only marginal for
any likely change in the composition of civrliaa demand.
131. S i the importance of military expenditure for most other
,primary commodities is smaller than for those dimmed above, ib
cessation, even if not offset by an e q d incxae in non-military expenditure, would produce a d e r peweatage of reduction in demand
:dor them. The realtocation of miIitary expenditure to non-military putprobably bring about a net increase in this demand. T'he
calculations made for the United Slates and the United
instance, suggest that this docatinn would increase the
both food and clothing and thus for fcadstu&~and textile
v'mteds in general,
132. Sme disarmament may be
d to result in an a d e r a $tionof economic growth, it shodd 5 t h te the growth of demand ht
"primaryproduction in p e t a l . Coupled with the fact that disarmament
, should be associated with a tendency for the advanced camtries to open
their markets more widely to foodstuffs, for instance, this would make
ifor a substantial growth of rirnary commodity trade. Accelerated eeojnomic growth would be st2 more powerful in increasing total demand
;for manufactures. In the past, an increased world demand for msrm.;facturesbas normally been w m i a t e d with increased intmnationd tm&
?in them. The tendency to reduce trade barriers should be prtieularly
'important in enabling developing countries to increase their eKpwts of
,manufactures to the more highly developed.
133. The over-alI impact of disarmament on the trade of d r ,,developedcountries is likely to be favourable, not only beaus? of the
1 accehation ofeconomic growth but also because of the greatly expanded
iaid to be expected from the mme advmeed countries. Bath private
#enterpriseand centraUy planned economies should also be prepred t.a
iopen their markets more widely to underdeveloped countries once the
trade restrictions imposed for seeurity reasons are lifted. There might,
:however, be instances in which declines in demand for particular com:modities would cause appreciable dfimlties. In these cases considemtion should be given to special aid for the cotmtries concerned, m the
-same way as for particular industries or areas within the principal disarming countries.
134. The immediate impact of disarmament on international emnmic relations during the conversion period is a matter that needs
to be given careful study along with the other conversion problems
already discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Changes in the level of agfeete
economic activity associated with disarmament in the major m ustrlal
countries would be a major determinant of the level of i n t m m t i d
trade during the conversion period. h the international field, as in the
domestic, nations need to be prepared to take whatever measures may
' prove appropriate to facilitate the reallomtion of resources and to

A

r-'

I

I

I

T

f

8

L

ensure that any temporary didomtima of economic life that might occur
are m i n h k d . The degree to which specid polides might be called for
would depend partly on tbe s p e d of the disarmament process.
135. If appropriate steps are taken it should be possible even in
the short run to avoid any significant reductions in the general Ievel of
primary product prim, but it needs nevertheless to be realized that
any Mure to acbieve this goal could have serious consequences, For
many of the countries mainly dependent on the export of primary commodities, a percentage decline in their export earnings which might apr small arithmetically could cause grave damage. For example, a
Cent drop in their average export prices, were it to take place,
would imply for the under-developed countries a decline in their foreign
exchange earnings equivalent to something like one-half of all official
economic pants and loans currently received from abroad in a year.'
Recessions in activity in the industrial countries have aused declines
of this order of magnitude in the recent past. Concerted international
@on would, therefore, be required to prevent any such decline in the
pnces and Incomes of primary producing countries as a result of dis-

rp

armament.

136. Even with favourable prospects for total trade, however,
special problems might arise during the conversion period for
countries or for trade in particular commodities. One such pmbr-lllar
em stems
from the fact that a few countries have been receiving considerable
foreign exchange from military aid and military expenditure, including
the outlays of foreign personnel. In these cases, special attention should
be given to the possibility of arranging future programmes of developmental assistance, and especially their timing, so as to avoid adverse
effects an their balances of payments.
137. A more wide-spread problem relates to particular countries
that are largely d ndent an the export of those commodities for
which world damn might suffer a temporary decline. In conjunction
with the formulation of any disarmament programme, therefore, it is
highly desirable that a detzuled study be undertaken on the changes in
demand for the various primary commodities which would result from
disarmament. The reduction of strategic stockpiles of primary commodities should be planned in such a way as to =use a minimum of
disturbance to international markets, and consideration should be 'ven
to the adequacy of already existing compensatory measures anfthe
pmibi1ity that additional measures might be required during the conversion period. Regardless of the technique employed, no country should
be d o w e d to suffer a disruption to its economio life, even temporarily,
as a result of disasmament.

T=

'In 1956-1959 tht sum of net oficiaI donations and offidal net long-term
lending to under-deveIo@ countries averaged $32 billion annually, or a b u t 126
per cent of the $252 billton annual average value of tbese countries' exports during
the same period. (See, resppetivtly, United Nations, Inr#mtiomI Flow o Lawt q Cu#ital and Oficial Donutipas, 1951-1959 (Sales Na : 62.II.D.l) , ta e 3 and
Umtd Nafioys, Morhhly B~rllefrvof Statuhc~,February 1962, table 43. The two
sets of stattsbcs dlffer somewhat m country coverage.)
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CHAPTER 6

TEE E-S
OF DlSON TEE VOLUME AND
E%AMEWORK OF AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVEU)EWENT
138. The promotion of economic and d a l developat in underdeveloped countries is one of the most imprtant ways in which the
resources released by disarmament could be put to use. Two-thirds of
the world's population lives in countries that obtain onIy a modest part
of the benefits which modern technology and science are mpbIe of
providing. The peoples of the underdeveloped aras are determined to
raise their levels of living, and the peoples of the more industrialized
countries have undertaken to help them do so. Progress has been made
since the Second World War in raising real incomes per capita in many
under-developedcountries. The platrning of economic and sdal development has been intensified in some and initiated in others, and the
mobilization of domestic resources for national development has become
a major policy objective. Tn many instances, domestic resources have
been supplemented by foreign loans, grants, private mpital flows and
technical assistance.
139. National efforts and international co-operation in the development of the under-developed countries have so far not brought: about
the desired acceleration of economic growth. The average rate of growth
in per capita income aver the past decade was still Iess than 2 per cent
per annum, and possibly as little as 1 per cent-l The absolute gap
between per capita incomes of rich and oor countries has been p r o g r e
sively widening.8 Even if future growt in the developed areas is left
out of account and t)le present levels of income in the developed areas
are taken as a target, the recent experience of under-dweloped areas
still appears disappointing. In under-developed areas the average level
of real income per capita is now less than one-sixth--and in many of
them less than one-tenth--of that enjoyed in such countries as Belgium,
Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom, Consequently, a future
p w t h rate no higher than 2 per cent per annum couId be expected
to raise t h e level of living in poor countries to that now prevailing in
the countries just mentioned only after a very long time.
140. An acceleration of the rate of growth of under-developed
countries depends upon many factors, including the adoption of appropriate national development programmes and, in many cases, social
and institutional reforms. Among these programmes an important roIe

R

'Owing to the margin of error in the population estimates of many underdeveloped countries (especiaIly the intcrsensd estimates), estimates of r-I income
in thest areas, which are rather crude in any cane, arc subject to an even wider
mn
a'
of error when expressad in per capita terms.
To narrow the gap, under-developed areas must experiaw a substadally
higher growth rate than the more advanced areas, dnet in the higher-income a r m
a given rate of growth implies much larger absolute increments to income
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must be assi td to encouragement of productive investment both from
domestic an foreign resources. To this end world disarmament could
make a major contribution. Despite the inadequacies of the available
statistics, it appears that the world's military expenditures far exceed
the combined gross investment expenditures of the less developed areas ;
&ey are probably at least five times as large and may bt much greater.
A much larger volume of resources could thus be allocated to investment
for productive development in these countries wen if only a fraction
of the r e s w m currently devoted to military purpases were used in
this way.
141. Assuming that the necessary national development programmes and social and institutional reforms were effectively realized,
under-developed countries would be able to absorb a considerably
larger flow of productive investment. The consequent effect upon the
rate of growth may be illustrated by a hypthetiml example in which
it is assumed that these countries devoted half of the resources l~hratcd
by disarmament to investment in productive capacity and that at the
same time the rate of total capital flow from more advanced countries
(both private enterprise and centrally planned) rose to around $15
billion annually, or somewhat more than I per cent of their aggregate
national product. This is a modest increase in view of the 8 or 9 per
cent they now devate to military purposes. Under these conditions, the
less advanced countries might be expected to increase their annual rate
of growth of national product from, say, 3 per cent to 5 per cent.
Assuming an annual rate of population growth of around 2 per cent, this
could mean a trebIing of the rate of incrmse in per capita income fiom
I per cent to 3 per cent.
142. The hypothetical example just given is based on certain
assumptions concerning income and investment and their interrelationship in under-developed areas. Although different sets of assumptions
would inevitably lead to somewhat different estimates of acceleration in
the rate of prowth in underdeveloped areas, there clearIy emerges the
genera1 conclusion that disarmament could bring about a marked increase
in the rate of growth of real income in the poorer parts of the world.
143. These conclusions are reinforced by a comparison of the
volume of resources now being devoted to military use with the various
estimates made in recent years of the external financial needs of the
underdeveloped countries. Four relatively comprehensive estimates of
global aid requirements are available? apart from a number of estimates
I

*These estimates of hanciaI needs are W on fragmentary data. nKp have
been c a m w e d in a United Nations dncummt prepared for the Committee on a
United Nations Capital Development Fund: T h e Ca+it&l Dmelopmmt Hcc& of
fkb Leas Dmelobed Contlh'e~(A/AC.!02/51. The earliest estimate is contained in
a report prepared for the United Natrons: Mrarures for the Economic D m l o p mrmt of Under-Dmeloped Camttr'rs (Sales No.: 51.IT.B.2). Its estimates concerned the nineteen-fifties, and were bawd on data for 1949 and earlier year#.
The second estimate is crmbined in Max F. M i l f ~ k n and W. W. h t m ,
A ProMml. Key to an Efective For&a Policy (New York, 19561. It i s based on
data for 1953 and earlier years. The third edmatc, contained in Paul G. Hoffman,
One Hrmdred Cwmtrics, One nnd One Quarter BilliPs Pcopk (Washinaton,
IW),
i s h a d on information available in 1959, and conems the dccade of tfte
nineteen-sixties. The fourth is contained in P. N. Rosmstein-Rodan, "Intnnatianal Aid for Under-dew!&
Countriesu R&
of Economics a d SkrsiSt~~
(Carnbrih Mass.) XLTTI (Map, 1961) mh coven thc years 19621976.

of aid needed for specific purposes. In these dcuIatioas, the total
amount of foreign capital required by the under-developed areas, over
and above their domestic resources devoted to invesbnent, is estimated
to range f m $6 bidlion to $10 billion annually. These figures are based
on conservative assumptions : the target rates of growth of per capita
real income are about 2 per cent, and the computatims are based on
assumed ratios between increments to real income and, on the one
hand, increments to employment, or, on the other hand, increments to the
st&
of ca ital, which past experience suggests are reasonable but
which c o d conceivably turn out to have underestimated the capital
needs should conditions prove to be less favourable than anticipated.
After allowing for the present flow of foreign apital through existing
institutions and arran ernents, the authors cited believe that there IS
a deficiency of about f3 billion a year that needs to be made p o d in
order to achieve the modsst annual rate of growth ia i n m e of 2 per
cent per capita4
f 44. Two further questions arise. First, would disarmament releasc
in suffident quantity the particular resources required for economic
development? Secondly, is the present institutional framework of aid to
under-developed countries likely to be affected by disarmament?
145. In the longer run, productive capacities can k adapted to
any chanced patterns of demand, and provided that the needs of underdeveloped countries are known in sufficient detail, no serious probIems
should arise in matching resources to uses. Even in the short run, however, it seems probable that a significantIy large proportion of the
resources absorbed for military tlse would indeed prove to be of a type
useful for investment in under-developed countries. An important proportion nf military expenditure absorbs the output of heavy indusw
and of the engheering and construction industries. The output of these
industrial sectors cotrld undoubtedlv make a valuable contribution to
the industrialization of the less developed areas and to their accumulation of social capital. Transportation and communication eouipment, for
example, is an important component of military expenditure and is
urgently reouired by under-developed countries. When a disarmament
praEramme is adopted it would be desirable for Governments to estimate
what resources would become available for peaceful purposes in the
various stages of the Proeramme. Tn the light of these data and detail-ed
information concerning the resources which underdweloped countncs
could usefullv employ in their developmental prommmes. it would be
possible for Governments to assess the share of the released resources
to he allocated to the investment n a d s of the Iess industrialized parts
of the world.
146. Disarmament would also release personnel. such as dentific
research workers and engineers, who could be utilized for other purposes.
!n the event of disarmament, it shotild prove possible for the industfiatrzed countries to provide greater technical assistance and thereby help
remove one of the serious limitations to development effotts in t h p
fountrips. Ftrrthermore, disarmament would free from military semce
m both the more advanced and the less developed countries hrge groups

d'

'Ibid.

42

~

e

m

r

d J ~ m
d n r ,~ V d . l

of young people. Past experience in utilizing their good will and enthusiasm in a number of countries indicates that when completely freed
from military preoccupations, many of them could make an important
contribution to economic and s o c d development in under-developed
areas.
147. With respect to the impact of disarmament on the framework and structure of aid to under-developed countries s e d points
need to be made. If we leave out of account--as seems proper m the
present context-short-term finance of all kind?, private grants, and
military and defence-support aid, the principal ~nternationalflows of
mpital to under-deveIo& countries consist of (1) official grants, (2)
official loans and credits on non-commercial terms, (3) long-term bans
and credits on commercial terms made by national governments and by
international authorities, and (4) private long-term loans or direct investment. Unlike capital flows of the last three types, official grants do
not, of course, burden the recipient country's balance of pa inents.

d'

Officialloans and credits on non-commercial terms are less bur ensome
than public or private lending on wrnmeraal terms: hence the distinction between the second and third categories.
148. Comprehensive statistics of loans and grants to underdeveIoped countries are not available according to the fourfold ckssifiation just mentioned. However, an impression of the over-all magnitude
and composition of loans and grants to under-developed countries can be
obtained from various sources! During the past few years the total net
flow of capitaI, as just defined, from private enterprise developed a n tries to under-developed countries averaged between $3.5 billion and
$4 billion annually. Abut half represented official grants. The remainder
consisted mostly of private lending.
149. In the fifteen years fmm 1945 to 1960 the sum total of
credits granted by the centrdly planned countries to underdeveloped
countries and of mutual assistance among the centrally planned countries
themselves amounted to about 52 billion old roubles. In the earlier years
the greater part of the credits was granted to other centrally planned
economies; in more recent years the emphasis has shifted to credits
to under-developed countries.
150. The increased international flow of capita1 f o under-developed
countries that is certain to result from disarmament could take any one
or more of the forms referred to above. Their relative importance would
be likely to change, however, since each of them would be affected
somewhat differently by the implementation of a disarmament prom

e
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151. As regards the flow of private -pi&!, it may be assumed
that this would continue to respond to commercial considerations.
Diminished worId tension resulting from disarmament, coupled with
additional means of encouraging private foreign investment in undeideveloped countries, might be expected to lead to a greater movement
of private capital into these countries.

L

@Sac Inlmmfi'otrol Flow o Long-term Copitat and O#5clof Dorurfiow, 195l1959 (Sales Na : 621I.D.l)
p. 1, and World Ecommc S w e y , 1960 (Sale#
Na : 61.XI.C1), pp. 119-121.
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152. At the present time, nine-tenths or more of OW
grants
and loans are given under bilateral proflames. Bilateral and multilateraI programmes of aid each have their own particular advantages
and disadvantages, and many of the considerations which now prompt
Governments to favour bilateral rather than multilateral aid might continue to hold g m d even in a disarmed world. On the other hand, in so
far as political circumstances have had any weight in determining the
direction and form of aid, effective disarmament and the related lessening
of international tensions should improve the prospects for more cooperative internationa1 action.
153. The discussions that have been held in the Economic and
Social Council and the General Assembly during the part eight years
concerning the need for an increased flow of aid through an international
fund within the framework of the United Nations bave frequently em~ F i z e dthe importance of the savings to be &rived from general
dsamament. The basic position of the General Assembly on this matter
r e e n s resolution 724 (VIII), adopted unanimously in 1953. Under
this resolution the General Assembly made the following declaration:
"We,the Governments of the States Membprs of the Uniicd Nations,
in order to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic
and social progress and development, stand ready to ask our voples, when
s d u e n t progress has been made in internationally supervised world-wide
disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings acbieved through such diaarmament t o an international fund, witbin the framework of the United
Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in under-developd

countries!'

154. It should be realized that the repayment of bans granted on
commercial terms may impose heavy burdens on the balances of payments of these countries. Concern has already been expressed in recent
years regarding the heavy accumulated indebtedness of a number of
countries and the growing dif3iculties they have been experiencing in
servicing outstanding loans. It seems urgent that as large a proportion
of economic aid as possible should take the form of grants or "soft',
loans. Disarmament would likely facilitate the increased flow of such
aid. This is so because the saving.s afforded by disarmament w d d
provide the aid-giving countries with a favourable o M t y to
increase their assistance without imposing an additions burden on
civilian expenditure. This should also l a d to a desirable broadening
of the existing basis of aid to include types of projects not adequately
covered under existing policies, and should therefore facilitate a balanced execution of development plans. Increased aid in the fields of
social investment should also become possible, as it is now generally
recognized that substantial investment in health facilities and particularly
in education is a prerequisite for obtaining the maximum bendits from
other development efforts.
155. Because the competing claims in developed countries are
also urgent, there is a serious possibility that the financial resources
released by disarmament might be rapidly absorbed by purely national
aims. It is therefore desirable that an appro riate proportion of these
resottrces should be allocated to internah0mf aid in its various forms
sirnuIhneously with their use for domestic purposes.
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156. It must be emphasized that foreign aid a n play only a
supplementary role in the development of these countries and that the
respnsibity for initiation and intensification of development efforts
wouId continue to lie entirely with the governments and peoples concerned. There are many countries in which foreign exchange resourca
are by no means the only nor wen the main Emhition on the rate of
economic growth. Such countries are not likely to be in a position to
utilize larger amounts of aid effectively unless they take the domestic
measures rfecessary to encourage such growth. There is reason to look
to the major powers to be generous in aIlomting resource freed by
disarmament to the development of underdevelo ed countries. But
there is also every reason to Iook to the under- eveloped countries
themselves to create the conditions favourable to their economic growth.
In this as in other fields discussed in this report, advance plannrng and
prepmtion are likely to enhance greatly the favourable impact of
general: disarmament.

g

CHAPTER 7

SOME SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DXS157. The economic and social consequences of disarmament are
inextricably intertwined. As already discussed, it would be possible to
bring about a significant improvement in many aspects of d Iife,
provided that some of the resources released by disarmament were
earmarked far fields such as education and scientific research, hdth,
housing and urban development. An idea of the magnitude of the needs
in these fields has k e n given in chapter 2. There are, however, some
aspects of s o d life which elude measurement, but which none the less
greatly a%& individual and family life and on which smoother humaa
relations within and between nations largely depend.
158. I n a disarmed world. a general irn~ovementcodd Ix expected in the lwei of iizting and in the candit~onsof under-privileged
and low-income groups such as the old and retired people whose share
in the social well-being is often meagre, even in the more developed
countries. With the end of the armaments race, Governments would
accord these social objectives a highex priority than in the ast. The
implementation of measures discussed in chapter 2 would ead to a
cumulative diffusion of social benefits.
159. The more rapid rate of economic growth and the increase in
productivity that may be expec!ed to result from disarmament might
weU permit a reduction in work~nghours, an improvement in the coaditions of work and a lengthening of paid vacahons. To take full advantage of the resultant longer leisure and the higher level of living,
wider cultural facilities would be required. In this context, eduation
acquires special significance as a means for disseminating culture.
160. In the domain of p e r s o d and f w i J y life, disarmament and
recession of the threat of war would decrease tensions which often bring
about psychosomatic illnesses. Human Iife would acquire a new meaning,
once war and preparations for war were eliminated. The whole prospect
of life would be brightened, especially for young peopIe about to enter
a profession or found a family, There would no longer be any separation from the family for compulsory military service, so that the
psychological, moral and material evils which this creates would IE
avoided. A greater stability in the family nucleus would be likely to
exert a favourable influence on m a d t y .
161. The very fact of disarmament would lead to a diminution
of tensions between nations and races. The tendency to divert: individual
and national frustrations into national and racial hatreds would be
lessened significantIy.
162. In a disamed world, the danger that 'security considerations
and armed forces might play an excessive role in farming the values

Y

of the community would be eliminated. It is important to note, however,
that attention would need to be paid to mnstructive outlets for individual
and collective aspirations.

163. If confidence is one of the necessary conditions for rwncluding a disarmament agreement, an increase of confidence would also be
one of its happiest consequences. A decrease in tensions and in the
influence of groups interested in armaments would bring about a
profound change in the form and content of m k ? ~ ~ t WMOW.
hd
Political and economic conflict between nations, with its attendant risk
of war, would more rapidIy be repIaced by constructive ~ ~ ~ u l a t i o n .
Scientific co-operation between nations would advance more rapidly, and
the peaceful utilization of science and technology w?dd be accelerated.
The arts, too, would greatly benefit fmm an densron of internationd
exchanges. AU the great civilizations in the past have gained fiom such
cultural contacts and have exerted their influenee beyond their own
frontiers. Disarmament would remove the main barriers to the far
greater exchanges that are now technically possible. Humanity would
thus be able to carry out co+peratively the projects which Iie beyond
the resources of a single country or a group of countries.
164. In short, disarmament would release resources from uses
in which they are not only wasted but also in many ways make the
remainder of mankind's wealth less effective in rotnoting welfare than
it would otherwise be. In reckoning the gains rom it, one must take
into account a general easing of tension and frustration and an enhanced
possibility of co-operation that would reinforce the direct economic
contribution of the resources released.
163. In view of this, as well as the conclusions reached in previous
chapters, there should be no doubt that the diversion-to peaceful purposes of the resources now devoted to military expenditure could and
should be of benefit to all countries and would lead to improvement
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of world social conditions.

CHAPTm 8

SUMMARY

rn

CONcLUsiONs

166. The present level of military expenditure not ady represents
heavj economic and social
burden on most countries. It absorbs a large volume of human ind
material resources of all kinds, which could h used to increase emwmic and social welfare throughout the world-both in the highly industrialized countries, which at the present time incur the bulk of the
world's military expenditures, and in the less developed areas.
.~ o U R C E SDEVOTED TO MILITARY PWRWGES

a grave politid danger but also imposes a

167. There app-rs to be general agreement that the world is
spending roughl $120 billion annually on military account at the
present time. ~ i i corresponds
r
to about one-half of the total gross
capital formation throughout the world. It is at least two-thirds ofand according to some estimates, of the same order of magnitude as
-the entire national income of all the underdeveloped countries.
168. It is important that countries, in preparing to disarm, should
take stock of the various resources that disarmament would r e l e for
peaceful uses. In the major military powers, military production. 5
highly concentrated in a few industry groups. In those coun*es that
reIy upon imports for their supplies of military goods or in which the
major part of military expenditure is for the pay and subsistence of the.
armed forces, rather than for their equipment, the resources devote&
to military purposes consist essentia1Iy of manpower and foreign
exchange.
--
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169. There are so many competing clai~nsfor usefully employing
&e resources released by disarmament that the r d problem is to
establish a scale of priorities. The most urgent of these claims would

undoubtedly already have been largely satisfied were it not for the
armaments race.
170. Increased personal consumption might well absorb a large
l a r e of the released resources. A substantial portion of them, however,,
would be used for expansion of productive capacities bemuse only such_
expansion can provide a firm basis for further increases in consumption..
In the less developed countries, the utilization of released resources for
capital formation must be considered vitally important.
'
171. Social investment is an important alternative both to p r i v a ~
consumption and to industrial and agricultural investment. Its daims
rest partly upon the clmr urgency of the direct need for improved e j d
47
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amenities, and p a d y upon the fact that growth of industrial and @cultural rductivity is dependent upon developments in sducat.10~1,
housing, ealth, and other fields.
172. The release of scientific and technical manpower would make
it possible to enmurage programttles of basic scientific research in fields
which have hitherto been neglected. Disarmament would also open u
possibilities for joint international ventures of an ambitious kind, s
as the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, space research,
the exploration of the Arctic and Antarctic for the benefit of tnankifid
and projects to change the climates of large areas of the world.
173. Thus, though it would take active decisions by Governments
in the light of national and international needs to set in motion the
necessary progmmmes for employing the released resources, it seems
abundantly clear that no country need fear a lack of useful empIoymcnt
opportunities for the resources that would become avaiIable to it through
disarmament.
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IMPACT
ON NATION& PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT
174. Disarmament would raise both general problems of main&inkg the aver-all level of economic activity and employment and
specific problems in so far as manpower or productive capacity might
require adaptation to non-military needs. In the economic life of all
countries, shifts in the pattern of demand and in the allocation of
productive resources are continually occurring. The reallocation of
productive resources which would accompany disarmament is in m y
respects merely a special case of the phenomenon of economic growth.
175. The post-war conversion was a much larger one and involved
a more rapid transfer of resources than total disarmament would r uire
at present. Nevertheless, huge armies were quickly demobilized wit
*t,out
a significant rise in unempIoyment m most countries. The pace of
recwery, particularly of industrial output, was impressively rapid. During the post-war conversion, however, the major concern of economic
policy was to restrain, xather than to maintain, over-all demand.
176. Much attention has already been
in the industrialized
p h t e enterprise economies to the methods by which total effective
demand can be maintained. Monetary and fisml policy could be used
to off set the e f f e of a shortfall in total demand that might result fiom
a decline in military expenditure to the extent that it were not offset by
a rise in civil government expenditure. Bearing in mind that a substmtial
part of military expenditure would probably be replaced by other government expenditure in most countries, it may be concluded that the
maintenance of effective demand in the face of disarmament should not
prove difiidt.
177. For many underdeveloped countries, the effect of disarmament upon the industrial countries' demands for primary products, and
thus on the export earnings of the primary producing countries, would
be of great importance. So wouId the methods of dealing with the
liquidation of strategic stockfles.
178. In the centraIIy planned economies, the maintenance of
effective demand while reducing miIitary expenditure would be simply

a nratBm of the &&cy

of planning tscbdiques. In masqeffective d m d could be readily maintained, and tkpimigd prdaaa
of conversion wwld concern the physid adaptation of p h b producing
srmrments to the production of goods for civilian use.
179. Ewn with the sumesful maintenance of total efldvc ddtduring a period of disarmament, W c a n f problems sf adjustmcnt would remain in spec& sectors and areas of the ec~mmy.The
resources now supplying military requiremeats muld be adapted to
peace-time needs partly by shifts within industries and plants. Tbia might
be a relatively easy procedure, in many cases involving little more tbatr
& q e s in designs, retooling, and minor adaptations of sbdUs, particularly in plants and enterprises wbich already produce bath mil*
and civilian goods. Shifts between industries would n e c d h b new
investment and acquisition of different ty es of skill by the working
farce. In the longer run disarmament woul allow each country to raise
the rate of investment and to adapt productive capacity more adequately
to tbe needs of the population and to the requirements of econamic
grqwtfi, h t h in the private enterprise and the centrally p h m d tcorn-
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180. Hypothetiml studies on the assumption that military expendkre is replaced wholly by increases in expenditure on other kinds
of g o d and &ces
suggest that in the event of very rapid d h m a merit some 6 or 7 per cent (including the armed forces) of the total
labur form in the United States and 354 to 4 per cent in the United
Kingdom would have to find civilin instead of military employment
or c h q e their employment from one industry group to another. These
s h i h would be small if spread out over a ntrmber of years and w a d i
be gready facilitated by the normal process of turnover. The higher the
fate. of growth of the economy, the easier the p a a s of adaptation.
181. Under-dewloped countries generally have heen meet@
their requirements for military goods and services by imports, so that
their disarmament would release foreign excbange rather than industrial
workers. It would also free members of the forces, many with useful
skills and training. Some of these could k usdully employed in the
development of social capital. In some of the semi-industrialized countries, newly started basic industries 4 d concentrate, without any
transitional diflicdty, on the manufacture of capital goods.
W . In the centrally lanned economies, where productive cap
is usm y u t i d it would be necessary to convert plants
producing military equipment to produetion of durable consumer go&
md of st& investment g o a l s as m n be produced in them with d y
mittor retooling. This could be done rapidly.
183. Some special problem would arise with regard to re
ment and training af manpower and reorientation of &en&
While most m e m k s of the armed forces have received t & G q that
wsarld fit them a i I y for civilian life, a specid effort would have to be
ma& to &nd -s
euapIoy~aentfor tfie rest. The dtmd%zath d
the ~ ~ s i o n fnrmbs
a l
of the armed forces would jmp?y +am@

Zs

that the number of new entrants for that period would be augmented
by this s p e d factor.
184. In industries depending heavily rn military orders, many of
the employees possess a level of skill that should find gainful mploy~
ment in other branches of production, so logg w over-all eEective
demand is rising. Even so, there might be some special cases which
would r uire special assistaace to encourage the adaptation d skills
to new
The uneven gcogrqhieal distribution of the activity b a d
on military expenditure would give rise to a need for various fwms of.
public and other assistance to facilitate readjustment.
- .
185. The task of shifting scientific and technical persmd to ndgmilitary fieIds of research in some cotintries would be considerable. 'No
teduction in the actual employment of scientific and technid Nsonnef
need be feared, however, because the demand for civilian r ~ d r ' w o u l a
increase rapidly.
..

j8s.

IMPACT
OH

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RUTIONS

186. Disarmament would be bound to have hourable d e c t s on
dEteufe that
would accompany an international disarmament programme w o a - in'
itself imply that nations were willing to reconsider their qonomic
relations with one another. The relaxation of inteindtoaal tqsiws
would provide a sound basis for reduction of trade ,barriers and foi
modihtion of existing trade agreements and trading practices..'h
important consequence of this would be s substantial increase in trade
between the centrally planned economies and the rest of ths world, . -

the development of internatianal relations. The political

187. Since disarmament may be ex-d
to result in an ace+&
it sl~ouldstimulate the growth of d-hd
for primary production in generd. Accelerated economit growth waul4
be still more powerful in increasing total demand for manufacture$. T ~
over-all impact of disarmament on the trade of under-dweloped countries is likely to be favourable, not only bebecause of the aderation &
q n o m i c growth but also because of the greatly expanded aid to be
expected from the more advanced countries.
188. Some exports of primary products, such as petroleum, rubber,
and most metallic ores, depend significantly at present on direct and
indirect demand generated by military purchases. Provided, howev,,
that miIitary expenditure were fully replaced by public and p r i m nonmiIitary spending, the impact on over-ail demand for these commodities
would be only minor. There might, however, k instances.,in whi&
wries in demand for particular commodities would muse appreciable
difiicultieg. In these cases consideration should be given to special aid.
for the countries concerned, b the same way as for particular industries
or areas within the principd disarming countries. For most other
primary commodities,the rallocation of military ex nditure to uvilisn
use would probably bring about a net increase in emand.

h of economic growth,

cr

189. During the conversion period changes in the lwel of aggregate economic activity associated with dismament in the Gjor.
industrial countries would be a wjbr debnbant of the lev4
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international
trade. It is believed &at significant fluctuations in the
general Ievel of international trade could be avoided, but it should
neveqheless realized that any failure to achieve this g o a l . . dhave
serious consequences. Regardless of the technique employed, no'counm
should be allowed to suffer a disruption to its economic life, even tern;
porarily, as a result of disarmament.
,

.. ...

,

1

"

!'

..

I

EFFECTSON
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190. National efforts and international co-operation in the development of the under-developed countries have so far not brought
about the desired acceleration of economic growth. A much larger
volume of resources could be altoated to i n v h e n t for productive
development in these countries even if only a fraction of the resourc.es
currently devoted to military purposes were used in this way. Dlsarmament could thus bring about a marked increase in the rate of
growth of r a l income in the poorer parts of the world.
191. Bilateral and multilateral programmes of aid each have their
own particlllar advantages and disadvantages, but in so far as F t i d
circumstances have had any weight in determining the directton and
form of aid, effective disarmament and the related lessening of international tmsions should improve the prospects for more co-opmtive
internationa! action. Since repayment of loans granted on commercia!
terms may Impose heavy burdens on the bdances of payments o,f the
under-developed countries, as large a proportion of economic ard as
possible should take the form of grants or "soft" loans.
192. Because the competing ckims in developed countries are
also urgent there is a *rims possib111 that the financial resources
released by disarmament mi ht be rapid
' y absorbed by purely national
aims. It is therefore desirab e that an appropriate proportion of thm
resources should be allocated to international aid in its various foms
simultaneously with their use for domestic purposes.
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193 Foreign aid, however, can play only a supplementary role in
ibility for initiation
the development of these countries and the res
and intensification of development efforts wod continue to lie entirely
with the Governments and peopks concerned.

r

SOMESOCIAL CONSEQVENCBS
194. In a disarmed world, a general improvement codd k expected in the level of living, including an increase in leisure, With the
end of the armaments race, Govements w d d m r d social objectives
a higher priority. The psychological, moral and material evils of ccmpulsory military s h c e and of stationing troops away-from their homes
would be avoided; so would the danger that s w r r t y considerations
and the armed forces might play an extensive role in forming the
d u e s of the community. Scientific co-operation and the arts would
benefit from an extension of international exchanges,

195. Tbe Consultative Group is unanimously of the opinion that
all the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament
could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There
should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the
resources now in military use couId be accomplished to the benefit of
all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and soda1
conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament
would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind.

ANNEXES

Raso~mow1516 (XV),

BY THB GENSRALA==Y

A

The G
&
Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 1378 (XIV) of a0 Nwembcr 1959,
Cob that tbe impact of d i m e n t i s likly to set in d
n great
chaoges in the domestic economies of States and in inknational ceonomic rclatimq as a result of the progressive diwrsion of human and mattriPl re@xi military to peaceful purposes,
R*cog&kg that &c~tiue action at the national an13 intvaatiod levels
nead to be tska to mnltE use of xmtcriai and human resourocs becoming adable
pa a o~nasqtrtnccof disarmamtot, in order to promote d a l progress and ktaer
standards of liviag in the work&

B
w im i d the importance of compmhenaive and systematic snrdito in
this h i d to enable Member States, crpedally tho* which are underdeveloped,
make the necessary economic and social adjustmentsin the event of d i s ~ c t l t ,
Cost&wed that it is both timely and desirable to unsuch studies,
1. Requests t
h Seuetary-Gmcral to examine:
(a) The national economic aud social consequences of disarmament in mumwith different economic systems and at diderent stages of economic dealop
mat, incldng, in particular, the problems of replacing military expenditures
with alternative private and public evil txpenditures so as to maintah effective
dtmatld and to absorb the human and material resources rtlcased from d t a r y

'3i&&1

I
I

I

trses;

( b ) The possfik dwdopmcnt of struaural imbalatl~ksin national economics

a a ~ C S & of the ~ ~ 9 s a t WofD capital investment m armaments iaduptriits, and the

adoption of possible corrective measures to prevent such imbalances, induding
cxpm~dadcapital assistance to the under-developed muntrits;
( c ) The impact of disarmammt on interciatiad economic relations, including
it. e h t on world trade and erpckdy o.the bade af under-developed co~mirits;
(d) T h e utilization of resmrccs relmed by disarmament for the purpose of
economic and social developmmt, in particular of the undtr-deve1opsd wuntrits;

2 Re~ommmd$t&ai the Secretary-General &odd conduct tbe propod
examination with the assistance of expert consultants to bt appointed by him with
due regard to thdr qualifications and to the need of geographical representation
and intimate knowledge of countries with different economic systems and at
Wamt 9tng;es of economic developmeat;

I
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3. Akp~aLrto Governments of Member States to give full cospwation to the
Secretary-General in the fulfilment of the task entrusted to him;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a preliminary r t p r t on the
results of the examination to the -Economicmd Social Council at its thirty-third
acssion ;"
5. Requests the Economic and Swial Council to transmit the report with its
views to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

. 948th $knary meeting,
15 December 1960.
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1. t&ormrtion r&ceming mi~taryeipendimre i
.conin
&iij
pubk accounts of central Governments md the n a t h d accoubto W
n
i g with
-8.
aationaI or material product and dated d a k Cmmtriea =ti, howeyer,
ia shdr W t i o n s of military -&hue,
and inforumtion z a ~ e r n i n g-tltch
m d d s of &ssiiic&on
& commonly not available. It is t h e m h e w
t
:
h
maag hatames to dererminc the content of &c official s t a W from an d
view. Some expenditturn that w d d k.
wsidered as m i l p r y
mwpomt may k excluded from the &cid data, &It aUwm'*tdd-bt wnsidqed as non-military may k included. Xn addition; there a@,
&udy
&Termws witfiin c o u n ~ ~h~the
s -basis of
of milimy otngutas compared with that of the output of thc -st of the em-,
Tiwe d i f E e r y
alone, even if the cweragc of tht expenditure-statistics were appropriatt, would
makc it imgossibk to indicate with-any piecision the p r o p d o n of mdrms
devoted to military wposera Furthermort, differept caumks.have different
&nomid ~tnsctrucsa d pattaw d prices, so that in compa*
cmntriea one,
wcidd obtain different ratios of military e x p d t u r e to national product a i d ik.
wmymmts m a d y from using the different price patterns. For dl these rdunsp:
&&
sI
t a t h h of military expenditure have only limited valut as a kads for
&wing
the cconomic burden imposed by the armaments race.
..
2 The following tables include the mogt readiIy available official -tics
og tditary vpcnditure and compare t h e with d m d c product aqd ikd.~gp&d:
formation. T h e tbree tables cover industrial private enterprise, atndcr-dtvdoped~
aad centrally planned countries respectively. In amordame with usud statia-,
practk, the concept of domestic prodtact in the first two W s is diffqmt from
that in the third table. In tables 2-1 and 2-2, dome& prod& in&&
&righating in both "material production'' and d e s . In d 1 e 25, &me$&
nod&, ineludes ~utputoriginating in material prodlaction ody. A furWr.&iera c e js that d o p d pr~dwtin *fes 2-1 and 2 2 is gross, dtpreciatian not ha*
deducteg from gross investment or income, while domestic product in @bk 24
3 ' n d of depkhtiotr. Accordingly, d i t a r g urpcnditurc i s compred with a *re
h. d- & defined m e w r e of product in tables 2-1 and 2-2 than in table 9 .

'm.

...

:

'5

" 'In &%
to-a &&ion
b tbr: Group of Experts, made at W'
session, the -orme
Smicial ~bmdagmxi to d*
consl~tiofi~~f%~
itan to its thirty-fudh session.

c o d a (million
doIlars) :

r 957
J858
1959

..............

..
;:.;.........
..............
Average 1957-1959. .

U ~ i t a dStates (million

dolkis) :
1957

a 958

..............
..............
..............

1959
Average 1957-1959.

.

Japanb(bilIion yen) :
1957
3958
199

..............
..............

..........'....

Average 1957-1959.

.

Eumm
Awl& (million

schillings) :
1957 ..............
195s

..............

.....

lqS9
,.........
kerage 1957-1959. .
B c l g i ~ m(millbn
francs) :

I
b

..............
..............
..............
K v ~ a g e1957-1959. .
1957
1958
1959

Denmark (million
boner) :

..............
..............
...............
byerage 719!S'-2959..
1957
1958
1959

C a r e

a d

~yrrACuunit
-

IS-

--

(cou#hed)
Swdm (million
kronor) :
1957
195s
1959
Average 1957-1959. .

..............
.............,
..............

S ~ t s e r l u n d(million

francs) :
1957
1958
1959

..............
..............
..............

Average 1957-1959.

.

Vffirsd Kingdom
(million pounds) :

I957
f 958

..............
...,....,.....
..............

1959
Average 1957-1959.

.

O u w ~ r ~
A w e (million
pounds) :
1957
1958
1959

..............

..............
..............
Average 19574959..
New Zcakrndb
(million pounds) :
1957
1958

1959

..............
..............
..............

Average 1957-1959.

.

S o w : United Nations, Stalislical Yearbook aad Yearbook of Ndional
A c c o u ~ sSfatklics, various issues.
"For differences between the concept of domestic product used in tables 2-1
and 2-2, as compared with table 2-3, see para. 2 of this annex.
'Fiscal years kginaing 1 April
'Including increase in stocks of local government enterpiiscs.
'F i l year ending 30 f une.
'Excluding government expenditure on equipment.
'Gross national product.
Including increase in stocks.
'Including expenditure on maintenance of roads and expenditure on motor
vehicles for ptrsonal use.

Tabb 2-2

Maiw

Cwnfry, pmmd
and
cuwnng unit

bud c t

erfirnhwrr

Cre::*

Amch
S4ma (million
pounds) :
1957
,1958
:
1959
Average 1957-1959.
Umim of Smtk Afn'ca
(miIlion pounds) :

..............
.. ...........
..............
.

1957

I958

..............

..............
..............

1459
Average 1957-1959. .
AMERICA,LATIN
Argmtka (million
pesos) :

I958

..............

..............
Ayerage 1958-1959..
1959

6,924b 318,400.0
15,589+4a 604,547.0

11,257.1'

461,474.0

65,610.0
107,985.0
-0

Brosil (billion
cruzeiros) :

1957

..............

........-.....
..............
Average 1957-1959. .
1958
1959

34.6

l,M3.1

124.5

40.8
41.1

1,2993

165.6
228.5

38.8

1,837.4
1J99.9

I729

Chile (miliion
escudos) :

1957
1958
1959

..............
..............

2223'

..............

73.1
82.2
91.1
82.1

..............
..............
..............

288A
306.4

.

274.7

17,651.0
m
7
7
.
0
22,sss.o

289.9

20,374-0

..............
..............
..............

13.4

A v w e 1957-1959..
Coiombia (million
pesos) :

1957
1958
1959

Average 1957-1959.
Costa Rico (million

247.0
309.9

2,9718'
4,163.P

a.0

3,EU'

320.6
2,630.0

3,350.0
3939.0
3,300.0

colones) :
1957
1958

1959
Average

.

1957-1959.

12.8
131

13.1

&-A;*

w

CMU
dkmt8ti.c
Grw
domrdic
w c ~ & f dd ~ d l k C
o
w
l
~ o d s d * tmmdtm p s d d fe

2,.30;3.F
2,465.01

434.8

2,529.8'

451.4
430.X

2,432Sf

4W.O

Aumc~U
,
~ (continued)
N
Ecuudor (million
sucres) :
1957
1958
1959
El Sdwador (million
colones) :
'1957
1958
3959 ..............
Average 3957-1959. .

..............
..............

..............

..............
..............

Guatnndo (million

quetzales) :
1957
1958
1959
Average 1957-1959.

..............
.

..............
..............

Hondww (million
lempiras) :

..............

1957
M c h (million
pesos) :

1957
1958
1959

..............

..............
..............

.

874.7

..............
..............
Average 1957-1958. .

1,083.8
1,265.4
1,174.6

Average 1957-1959.

P m (million soles) :
1957
1958

Yenenrb (million
bolivares) :
1957 ..............

..............
..............

1958
1959
Average 1957-1959.

.

Anil

B a d (million
kyats) :

1957
1958
1959

......,.......

..............
..............

Averap 1957-1959.
Cumbodio :

1957

.

..............
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drfilhry
bud ct

~~AY~,P~@

crpmli+wc

oj

(continued)

&W

donu&

P P ~ Y ~ *

Gross
~ ~ M J I ~ C&US:

l t r d cap!td b m d &

Cqplm (million
me=) :

..............
..............
..............

.

Average 1957-1959.
CAim (Taiwan) :
Am=
1957-1959..
Fedmtion of Mulayu
(rnilliom dollars) :
1957
IndiamCmilIion
rupces) :
1957
1958
Average 1957-1958. .
I n h s i o (miUion

..............
..............
..............

2,828.0

114,100.0'

2,787.0
2,m.O

124,W.O"
119,450.0"

...
.....

157.08

IO,I19.0

890.0

rupiah) :

1957
1958

..............
..............
..............

1959
Average 1957-1959.
lsracl (million
pounds} :
1957
1958
1959
Average 1957-1959..
KOYW( R e ~ u b l uof)
(billion hwan) :
1957
1958
1959
Average 1957-19SP..
Lebanon (million

.

..............

............,.
..............

..............
..............
..............

pounds) :

1957
1958

..............
..............

Average 1957-1958.

Pukistam :
Average 1957-1958..
Philippines (million
pesos) :
1957

.

..............

GfWt
domsoic

lExrd

m#&I

fe
w fe

Asu (continued)

1957
1958
1959

Vd. 1

----

-

--

- C

--

-

I
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Tdk 24 ~~)

Y-v
-%
4
Grorr
Gma

- -ceu*s*r, PnJos.
, asmtJ-w
A m e-j
S*

Arab Rapwblic
(lnuiuu~rotmds):
1957
lW&d(million
1957
1958
1959
A
-

.............. 14aa
.............. 1
.............. im.7
.............. 11.465.1
,439B

#,@OD

411JNO&

46m.0

&asp.o
.r,&43
~ Z

..............

3mX8.0

4B33.0

1957-1959..
Twkey (Cmillion Iirw) :
1957
195s
199

..............
...............
199-1959..

A~erarpe

959.1"
%4#

tl&lc
1,MO.S-

EvmwE
*tee (miIlipn
mdmaa) :

1957

I953
1959

A-

..............
..............
...............

t957-1399,.
Pwfygd Imillian
umdos) :
19$7
1m.
Average 1957-1958.
S#& (million

..............
...............
.

P a s ):
l95T

..............

1,SW,0
4,560.0
4,mO

4,550.0
1,7S4.0

1,845d
1,7994

10~1.0

2,514.P

45,458.0

2(56A

5.6

526

6,434b

3A

*%A

Q32

21.3

Ckino (maidund) (million
Ytm) :
1957

..................
..................
.............. :...
Average 1957-1959, ....

1958
1959

C~eckosiovrrkia(milIion
korun) :

1957

..................
...........-......

1958
1959
Average 1957-1959,

.............;. ...
-

.

,. ..

~ w t Gemlofly
k
(million
marks) :
195s

..................

PolonP (million zfotyy :

jw

1958
: 1959:

...................
......-..a-.........

...................

Average 1957-1959:.

...

Romaaiu (miIlion lei) :
1957 ..................
1958 ..................
1959
Average 3957-199. ....

..................

Union (million
roubles) :*

"

.1

..................
..................
..................
Average 1957-1959.. ...

1957
1958
1959

5,510
&W
5,8M

9 3 w
1ZSW
152,MP

1&m'
21,400O
24,W0

5,W

lD$&F

19,533'

4.4"
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Tabk 3-3
DIWO3 AND IHD-

-MY

PAW Y

DBYAtPfl POB

A

W

(As ~ C T E C I I ~of
~ ~Ikbk
R
tow rrrorld w
l
y 1958 and 1959)

Crude Petroleum ........................
Natural rubber (crude) ..................
Metallie ores:
Cogper ................................
Nickel ................................

Tin

...................................

..........................
..........................
......,...................,....
................... .
.
.......
Mangmese ............................
chromite ..............................
h a d and zinc
Molybdenum
Bauxite
Iron ore

45

4. I

Cdu-3
&9

1.5

1.4

3.0

29

7.8
6.0
4.9

15.7
12.0
9.8
9.4

14.7
95
93
9.4

42
3.5
26

7.4
4.8
4.7
43
3.4
3.9
2.5

8.3
7.1

6.8
645

5.3

4-9

1.3
1.1

13
1.1

2.7

26

2.3

22

C-1

4.7

C-2

0-C

8.3

Sotracgs ~ r -ODS:
n
Direct and indirect miliw dtmand for raw material
was computed from the worksheets for 'The EeonomK: Effects of Disarmamd
(Couthwd m p. 66)

Tabla 3-3 ( f o o t n o f e ~continued]
,
(by

.W.W. Leontief

and Marvin Hoffenberg, Sciefitilft Amdcas,

April, 1961)

&tamed from the EIsrrard Economics Research Projcet. World supplies d
natural rubber are from Rubbw Statislicol Bulletira, 16:2 (November 1%1)., p. 2
World supplies of mineral are from U.S. Department of the Interior, M 1 s d
Yembook, 1959. POI.
I, pp, 124, 125.
'Generated by $4,585 million of goods and services purchased under thc U.S.
military budget of 1958.
8A: a rough approximation, aszumed to be equal to twice the U.S. military
exptndlture.

( A s ~wcmlageof world srrpply, 1958 aed I P S )

.........................

Crude petroleum
Natural rubber (crude}.
Metallic ores:

-0.09

.................. 0.05
Copper ................,..............-0.96
N U .....................
.......... 4.76

-0.08
0.0s

4.18

-0.90
-0.60

-1.92
-1.51

..................................
43 -432
-0.32
..........................
b0.32
-0.06
-0.05
...................
.
.
..
.
.
-0.52
-0.48
...............................
-0.04
-0.03
..............................
......................... -0.02
-0.02
-0.~2
......................*m.-m*..
402

Tin
Laadad h
MoIyWen~m
Bauxite
Iron me
Manganese
mmtte

0.10

-0.16
0.09

-1.81
-1ZI

-Oh?

-d63

-0.64
4 . 1
-1.04
-0.
4 0 4

-054

-0.09
-0.96
-4.W

4-03

-0.m

-4d4

!bmm:Scet@e3-3.Ths
~inthistablcwcrederivo8bymultip'
h~terphluhhhlc~lborcinmlum.2dW.-tid.n~
H o Z ~Op.
, at,bble 8.
to $4fS,r000rn
' A a s d e q d to twice the United states dtq e x p d h m
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